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Chapter 1: Effects of local media reductions on idiosyncratic risk of nearby firms
INTRODUCTION
Media play an important role in capital markets (Tetlock, 2014), but the number of
newspaper and broadcast journalists in the United States has fallen by a third in the past 20 years,
according to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates. Many of those losses have come from cuts
at local and regional news organizations, and the role local journalists play in capital markets is
less clear.
The reductions in the number of newsgatherers in the United States raise important
questions about the effectiveness of democratic institutions (Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido, 2013;
Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrio, 2019) and monitoring of public officials and governments (Nyhan
and Reifler, 2015; Gao, Lee and Murphy, 2019). I find that it also has implications in equity
investment decisions. A reduction in media employment in the metropolitan statistical area of a
company’s headquarters is related to an increase in the standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns
and that increase appears to be driven by increased idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Employing a
dynamic difference-in-differences design, I find that reduced potential news coverage of a firm
affects its idiosyncratic risk for several years after the media employment reduction is recorded.
I also explore the channels through which a reduction in local media employment might
influence firm-level idiosyncratic risk. Attention models (Klein and Bawa, 1977; Merton, 1987)
predict that declines in investor awareness will decrease the informativeness of markets. Real
effects on product markets can also play a role in idiosyncratic risk (Gaspar and Massa, 2006;
Irvine and Pontiff, 2009), with decreasing market power being associated with increased volatility
of returns. Finally, the reduced levels of information available to investors may increase their
estimation risk, reducing certainty about assessed fair values.
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Through a series of empirical tests, I find little support for the hypotheses that investor
attention decreases or that competition increases after a firm is affected by a reduction in journalists
employed nearby. I find evidence that the increased idiosyncratic risk of affected firms is instead
driven by increased estimation risk or information asymmetry among investors.
In addition to identifying a role for local journalists in capital markets, this research
contributes in two other primary ways. First, prior research on the media’s effect on firm
performance has focused on short-term impacts and reversals (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Fang and
Peress, 2009; Fedyk, 2018) rather than the longer-term effect on capital markets and asset pricing.
Second, prior research has exploited legacy print publication (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Barber
and Odean, 2008; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011) and television broadcast schedules (Busse and
Green, 2002; Neumann and Kenny, 2007; Engelberg, Sasseville and Williams, 2012) to identify
effects of information release. However, the prevalence of Internet-only outlets, as well as web
and social media use by traditional print and broadcast outlets, has made it difficult to determine
whether the information landscape has changed in such a way as to diminish the role of traditional
news reporters and broadcast analysts in financial markets. My findings provide evidence that
journalists continue to play a significant role in the capital markets. My sample considers the period
from 2003, the year after many of the oft-cited examples of media effects on financial markets end
(Barber and Odean, 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011). I find that a
reduction in employees categorized as “reporters and correspondents” and “broadcast news
analysts” in a local market continues to affect firms in ways consistent with previous findings,
suggesting that the media’s role in capital markets persists, perhaps supplemental to changes to
technology and theories about those changes effect on investor behavior.
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MOTIVATION
Theoretical models
Much of the previous literature on the role media play in capital markets has focused on
national or international news outlets. Relatively little has addressed how local or state reporting
may affect firm risk and value. However, many of the information models proposed in the literature
are potentially affected by reporting at all levels. In a simple model, Neuhierl, Scherbina and
Schlusche (2013) consider that news (corporate disclosures, in their setting) may lead investors to
revise both their estimate of the fair value, v, of an asset and the precision with which it is
estimated, σv. The arrival of value relevant information thus replaces the investor’s prior valuation
model VFIRM ~ N(v, σv), with the new one, VFIRM ~ N(vNEW, σv,NEW). A reduction in the
number of local journalists able to reveal information about a nearby firm does not entail, ex ante,
a change in the fair value estimate of the stock, v. However, a change to the information
environment around the firm may lead to a change in future estimations about the precision with
which that expected value is forecast (i.e., a revision to σv). The change in precision in which the
mean return is estimated, σv,NEW - σv, could lead to increase in the volatility of the returns,
specifically the firm-specific, or idiosyncratic, risk, particularly if the added estimation risk creates
a wider expected variance of values of v. If increased estimation risk is interpreted by investors as
increased information asymmetry, increasing estimation risk may also drive market prices lower,
even if average estimates of value hold constant. An increased estimation risk may also affect
volatility of returns if, as Neuhierl, Scherbina and Schlusche (2013) argue, when valuation model
assumptions are weakened, (i.e., σv,NEW > σv ), then a security’s price reacts more strongly to
subsequent information signals.
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Klein and Bawa (1977) also consider estimation risk in their attention model, and conclude
that the effect of increased estimation risk is, for risk-averse investors, to move more of their
investment into a riskless asset. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model price informativeness as more
uninformed investors move out of the market for a security, and market-makers face an increased
risk of adverse selection from a higher concentration of informed investors (Glosten and Milgrom,
1985; Kyle, 1985). Informed investors profit from uninformed investors and market-makers, so
information becomes less valuable as the proportion of informed investors increases and the
market becomes less profitable to the informed investors who remain in the market. Combined,
Klein and Bawa (1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that the volatility of prices could
increase as remaining informed traders realize smaller profits, market-makers widen the bid-ask
spread to hedge against adverse selection, and a lower concentration of uninformed investors
participate in the market for a security.
Merton (1987) proposes a model in which investor attention, not estimation risk, is the
relevant constraint. Although investors can potentially diversify away all idiosyncratic risk by
including an infinite number of assets in their portfolios, their actual portfolios are functionally
limited to assets with which they are aware. Merton models “awareness” as both knowing about a
firm, i.e., that it exists as an investment opportunity, and being able to properly assess parameters
that affect its operation, i.e. estimate its value. 1 If investors are “unaware” of an asset, either
because they do not know that an investment opportunity for a firm exists or because they cannot
properly estimate its value, then it cannot be included in their portfolios. (Obviously, in reality, the
former is a more binding constraint to investment, and limiting an investor’s ability to effectively
estimate value-drivers could mean increased estimation risk rather than an inability or
1

In Merton’s model, only one level of information exists and incorporates both awareness and equal assessments of
fair value.

4

unwillingness to invest in the asset at all.) Merton’s model suggests that firms that fall short of the
optimal number of investors will have to deliver higher returns to current investors because of the
additional risk those investors carry and that should awareness increase, more investors will buy
securities in the firm and the value of the company will increase.

Local media as information provider
For attention and information models to apply to local reductions in media employment,
local media must, of course, provide at least the perception of value-relevant information. A variety
of research has examined the role of the financial press, at the national and international level, as
an information intermediary in capital markets and in security asset pricing. The number of
headlines about a firm contribute to momentum effects on asset prices (Chan, 2003). A lack of
news stories in major national outlets can mean investors require a higher return from a company
(Fang and Peress, 2009). Financial journalism and sell-side financial analysts play complementary
roles as information intermediaries (Ahn et al., 2019; Guest and Kim, 2019). Media coverage can
help investors interpret information (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Demers and Lewellen, 2003;
Bushee et al., 2010; Twedt, 2016; Guest, 2017), but investors can also overreact to “stale” news
simply because it is repeated prominently (Carvalho, Klagge and Moench, 2011; Fedyk and
Hodson, 2014; Marshall, Visaltanachoti and Cooper, 2014; Tetlock, 2014).
Anecdotally, local news sources have sometimes been in a unique position to provide
investors information relevant to firm valuation. In January 2005, shortly after being named CEO
of RadioShack, David Edmondson was arrested for driving under the influence in Fort Worth,
Texas, where the company is headquartered. It was his third drunken driving arrest, and the local
newspaper, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, began looking into Edmondson’s past. About a year
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later, Star-Telegram retail reporter Heather Landy revealed that Edmondson had lied about two of
the degrees listed on his resume. The story was picked up by national news outlets across the
country, including Bloomberg News Service, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times. A
week after Landy’s story was published, RadioShack’s board announced his resignation, in
February 2006. The day Landy’s story first appeared, RadioShack’s board issued a statement
saying, it was “aware of the matters raised in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram article and has
previously given due consideration to them.” However, in announcing Edmondson’s resignation a
week later, RadioShack’s executive chairman, Leonard H. Roberts, admitted, the board knew
“some, but definitely not all” of the issues raised in Landy’s reporting. 2 In the week between
Landy’s story being published and Edmondson’s resignation, RadioShack shares fell more than
10 percent.
While some research exists on the aggregate effects of local media reporting on trading, it
is unclear that local journalists generally provide information that is valuable to price discovery.
Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find that coverage by local media
outlets encourages trading activity within their coverage areas and that this increased volume of
trading is associated with increased prices. Gurun and Butler (2012) find that local media are
subject to “hype” when covering firms headquartered nearby. They determine that local news
outlets are more likely to cover local firms with a positive slant and suggest that media outlets are,
in a sense, captured because of their advertising relationships. Gurun and Butler (2012) find that
security prices increase temporarily as a result of this hype, but that the prices reverse shortly after
the positive coverage. In a survey of journalists, which includes several local news outlets, Call et
al. (2018) find that journalists acknowledge pressure from management to avoid unfavorable

2

New York Times, Floyd Norris, “RadioShack Chief Resigns After Lying,” Feb. 21, 2006.
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stories, but that they consider monitoring companies one of journalism’s most important functions.
Call et al. (2018) also find that journalists have incentives to produce high-quality articles with
exclusive content and that negative articles have the most impact.
Overall, prior research has not determined conclusively whether journalists provide valuerelevant information or simply encourage noise trading. Furthermore, the explosion of Internetonly outlets and social media sites (Antweiler and Frank, 2004) may have made the possible
mechanisms by which local news media produce and disseminate value-relevant information, well,
irrelevant. However, the FCC notes that “an abundance of media outlets does not translate into an
abundance of reporting” (Waldman, 2011). In fact, studies by the Pew Center for Excellence in
Journalism and others suggest that the vast majority, sometimes as much as 95%, of stories
collected and shared by all media originates with what are called “legacy” media, i.e., a newspaper
or local broadcast station. Just as investors face attention constraints, national and international
news outlets and agencies may also lack resources to uncover many stories at the local and state
level and rely on local media outlets to find stories they can aggregate or report more thoroughly.
Therefore, despite the increasing number of outlets online, “TV stations and newspapers have
emerged as the largest providers of local news online” (Waldman, 2011).
Cage, Herve and Viaud (2019) also examine the sources of online news, initially using a
“transmedia” approach agnostic to which type of media company originally published new
information and then tracking back the original source. They find that almost two-thirds of articles
contain at least some copied material, and that original stories are disseminated by other media
outlets in under 3 hours on average, and sometimes in as little as 4 minutes. Almost three-quarters
of the original content that did not originate with news agencies, such as AFP and Reuters, came
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from newspapers, while 11.5% was from television news stations. Radio and online-only news
sources account for about 10% and 7% of original content, respectively.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Idiosyncratic risk
Reduction in local media coverage could increase the idiosyncratic risk of firms within
their coverage area through declining attention, increased product market competition, or increased
estimation risk. It is also possible that local media, i.e. reporters and broadcast journalists located
within a metropolitan statistical area or other geographic region, provide no new incremental
information or awareness over national media outlets and electronic sources. Idiosyncratic risk is
not directly observable (Xu and Malkiel, 2003), as a security’s standard deviation captures both
the systematic risk, as typically measured by the market beta3, as well as the firm-specific, or
idiosyncratic risk. To isolate the effect of media employment reductions on idiosyncratic risk
specifically, I employ two indirect methods. First, I match treated firms with a control sample by
size (log of market value) and market beta, as computed by regressions of daily returns each year
for each firm with the Fama-French Three-Factor Model (Fama and French, 1993, 1997). The
calculated beta from these regressions finds the correlation of returns for individual securities to
the overall market. The small-minus-big (SMB) factor measures the difference between the excess
return on a portfolio of small versus big capitalization stocks, and the high-minus-low (HML)
factor is the difference between the excess return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks

3

As in the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the Fama-French Three Factor Model in
Fama and French (1992 and 1993), the Carhart Four Factor Model in Carhart (1997) and others.
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versus low book-to-market stocks. Fama and French suggest that these factors incorporate
elements of systematic risk distinct from the firm’s relationship to the overall market.4
Because treated firms are matched with control firms on market beta, any differences due
to systematic market risk should be minimized. However, I also hypothesize that a more direct test
of a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, the firm-specific residuals from the Fama-French Three Factor
regressions, will also demonstrate significant increases among treated firms when compared with
control firms.

Hypothesis 1: A decrease in local media reporters and broadcast analysts leads to increased
standard deviations of returns (and increased root mean squared errors from Fama-French Three
Factor regressions) for firms headquartered in those geographic areas.

If, as demonstrated in the Results section, the idiosyncratic risk of firms located within
geographic areas that experience a decrease in local media employment increases significantly,
that increased risk may be the result of decreased awareness about the firm’s securities as an
investment option. It is also possible that reducing the number of reporters or broadcasters
available to share firm information has product market consequences for companies (Grullon,
Kanatas and Weston, 2004). Increased idiosyncratic risk may also be due to higher levels of
estimation risk of value for a firm in which investors now perceive themselves to be more at risk
of adverse selection from informed traders and firm insiders.

4

In unreported results, I also employ the market model and the Four Factor model of Carhart (1997) to match on
market beta and collect residuals. Results are consistent regardless of which method is employed; however, because
the Carhart momentum factor may be correlated with attention, I use Three Factor matching and results in my
reported results.
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I form affirmative hypotheses for each possible channel of increased idiosyncratic risk,
decreased attention, reduced market power (i.e., increased competition), and estimation risk.

Attention
Although it is unlikely that previously aware investors become unaware of a stock simply
because it is not mentioned as frequently in the media they consume, Tversky and Kahneman
(1973, 1974) and Shiller (1980) suggest that individuals suffer from recency bias. And Yuan
(2015) finds that attention-grabbing events predict trading behavior and market returns. If investors
overweight the most recent information they have received, they may 1) shift their investments
from securities that have previously received coverage to stocks that have received attention more
recently or 2) focus new investment activity on securities in which they have more recent
information. Whether these investors are considered informed or uninformed (Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980) could affect whether they realize gains or losses as they benefit or suffer from
adverse selection . Regardless, however, if attention is declining, it may be reflected in at least two
other independent settings. Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) find that Google search traffic for a
firm’s ticker symbol is related to overall investor attention in the security, and my first attentionrelated hypothesis compares reductions in local media coverage with the Da, Engelberg and Gao
(2011) measure of investor attention:

Hypothesis 2: A decline in local media employment in a firm’s geographic region is
accompanied by a decline in overall investor attention for the firm as measured by Google search
traffic.
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I also examine levels of overall trading activity and whether a reduction in media
employment is correlated with decreased activity. Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg and
Parsons (2011) suggest that recent news about a firm, regardless of whether it reveals new
information, drives an increase in local trading. Barber and Odean (2008) find that retail investors,
who are likely to be relatively less informed traders, buy attention-grabbing stocks rather than sell
on news.
A complication arises in testing trade volume. The SEC estimates that more than half of all
trades are now conducted by high-speed computer algorithms, also known as “high-frequency
trading” (Gerig, 2015). Menkveld (2013), however, finds that HFTs operate much like traditional
market-makers, incurring losses on their inventory and profiting on the bid-ask spread as
compensation for the risk of adverse selection. In the dynamic difference-in-differences setting,
overall trends in number of trades should be absorbed so only the group-specific number of
abnormal trades associated with the treated firms are detected. My second hypothesis posits that
investor attention declines after a reduction in local media employment:

Hypothesis 3: A decline in local media employment in a firm’s geographic region is
accompanied by a decline in overall trading activity in the corporation’s stock.

Competition
Even if attention levels remain constant, a firm’s idiosyncratic risk can be affected by
increasingly competitive environments (Gaspar and Massa, 2006; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009; Abdoh
and Varela, 2017). Gaspar and Massa (2006) find that firms can use their market power to pass
along a larger proportion of idiosyncratic cost shocks to their consumers. They also find that an
ability to avoid competition decreases uncertainty about firms’ future performance. Irvine and
11

Pontiff (2009) find that increased idiosyncratic risk is tied directly to increased volatility of cash
flows. Abdoh and Varela (2017) find that higher levels of competition are associated with higher
proportions of idiosyncratic risk. Reductions in media employment could have product market or
cash flow implications for firms if affected companies face higher levels of competition because
they lose a channel for disclosing firm and product news or a medium for advertising is eliminated
or less effective. Gurun and Butler (2012) find that local media outlets essentially reward
advertising dollars with positive coverage of advertisers. If, as Gurun and Butler (2012) find, local
media outlets provide another outlet for firm advertising or marketing in news stories because of
their advertising relationships, then a reduction in the number of reporters or broadcasters able to
produce favorable stories could affect firms’ product markets (and also potentially their investor
relations ). If firms face increased competition because of the loss of this “hype,” then increased
idiosyncratic risk may be the result of effects on cash flow volatility or market power. My next
hypothesis relates reductions in local media employment with increased levels of competition.

Hypothesis 4: A decline in local media employment in a firm’s geographic region reduces
a firm’s market power (concentration) and increases competition within an industry.

Estimation risk
Next, I consider another possible channel through which a decline in local media coverage
may be linked to a firm’s increased idiosyncratic risk. In addition to being reflected in idiosyncratic
risk, increased levels of estimation risk will be reflected in increasing levels of perceived
information asymmetry. Whether local news stories reveal genuinely new information about a
firm, any coverage may give retail investors a sense of firm value through assurances of monitoring
or disclosure about cash flow information. If the information environment is understood by
12

investors to be worse after a reduction in local media, then the perceived probability of facing
adverse selection increases. The information models of Klein and Bawa (1977), Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that bid-ask spreads will increase as
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors increases and as informed
investors make up larger percentages of the market for a security. Most information models
consider “informed” and “uninformed” as a binary; however, real markets reflect varying levels
of information. Investors who become aware of a security through local, or even national, media
coverage could potentially be classified either as informed or uniformed investors. However, most
prior research suggests that the majority of retail stock-pickers acting on information relayed from
the media will, in aggregate, function as uninformed traders (Barber and Odean, 2008; Engelberg
and Parsons, 2011).
Chan (2003) finds that the number of headlines about a firm contribute to momentum
effects on asset prices. Tetlock (2011); Carvalho, Lagge, and Moench (2011); and Fedyk and
Hodson (2019) find that investors overreact to news that has already been revealed simply because
it is repeated. Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find that coverage by
local media outlets encourages trading activity within their coverage areas, and Huberman (2001)
finds that regional investment reflects overinvestment in familiar firms, beyond levels that would
be reflected in a rationally diversified portfolio. Fedyk (2018) finds that even finance
professionals’ trading decisions can be affected by placement of headlines on Bloomberg terminals
independent of those headlines’ news value.
Gurun and Butler (2012) find that local media tend to “hype” local firms that advertise with
the news outlet and price increases are followed by quick reversals. Grullon, Kanatas and Weston
(2004) find that product market advertising can also serve as investment advertising and can
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increase the number of retail shareholders of the firm. Given these findings, I treat investors
influenced by local media coverage as relatively “uninformed” and subject to adverse selection as
in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
Evaluating estimation risk using a common proxy for information asymmetry is
problematic. The effects, as in Merton (1987), of declining attention and increased estimation risk
would be identical when evaluating information asymmetry, which is commonly proxied by the
bid-ask spread (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; McInish and Wood, 1992; Lee, Mucklow and Ready,
1993; Chan, Christie and Schultz, 1995; Grullon, Kanatas and Weston, 2004; Carlin, Longstaff
and Matoba, 2014). If uninformed investors move to decrease or eliminate a security from their
portfolios because they are (or become, with recency bias) relatively unaware of a company, fewer
uninformed investors are available to provide liquidity to the market for the asset, and bid-ask
spreads increase. If fewer uninformed investors participate in a security’s trading because they no
longer believe their assessments of the value of the security are reliable then the effect is the same:
fewer uninformed investors in the market for the security, reduced liquidity, and increased bid-ask
spreads. If however, as I demonstrate in the Results section, overall levels of attention and trading
appear unaffected by reductions in local media employment, then statistically significant increases
in the bid-ask spread may imply that (uninformed) retail investors, specifically, decline to invest
in securities with which they are familiar but unable to form reliable valuation assessments.

Hypothesis 5: Even contingent on attention levels of securities being similar, the bid-ask
spread of firms headquartered in locations where local media employment declines will increase
relative to firms unaffected by such a local media employment shock.
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Hypothesis 5 examines a possible effect realized when uninformed, or noise, traders are no
longer able to arrive at a fair valuation of an asset because of increased information asymmetry.
To confirm the effect on retail investors, I explore another hypothesis. Institutional investors are
generally classified as “informed” investors (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Chan and Lakonishok,
2004). As large investors, institutional investors frequently hold large blocks of a security, which
means firms held by institutional investors have relatively fewer overall shareholders. Therefore,
if decreasing media coverage increases estimation risk among retail investors, the effect on bidask spread will be more pronounced when the number of shareholders is relatively higher.

Hypothesis 6: Firms headquartered in locations where local media employment declines
will have relatively higher bid-ask spreads as the number of shareholders increases.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Bureau of Labor Statistics data
Information on the number of reporters and correspondents in an area is taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics program. The survey produces
annual estimates of employment for 810 specific occupations in more than 580 areas, including
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and nonmetropolitan areas throughout the U.S. states, the
District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. Because of the way the survey is conducted, its results
cannot be used for time-series analysis. The OES “surveys approximately 180,000 to 200,000
establishments per panel (every six months), taking three years to fully collect the sample of 1.2
million establishments. To reduce respondent burden, the collection is on a three-year survey cycle
that ensures that establishments are surveyed at most once every three years.” The data are
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collected for the reference months of May and November by state workforce agencies, with BLSprovided surveys and instructions. Responses are collected by mail, email, Internet or other
electronic means, telephone, or in-person visit. The statistics are compiled annually after each
year’s May survey and are released in March of the following year.
I use the total numbers of employees in the Reporter and Correspondent categories, which
include both the Publishing Industries, such as newspapers and periodicals, and the Radio and
Television Broadcasting Industries. These two industries account for almost 90 percent of the
employees counted as Reporters and Correspondents in the May 2018 estimates. The remainder
were listed as employees of Other Information Services; Motion Picture and Video Industries; and
Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools.
The employment total used in my analysis also includes Broadcast News Analysts, which
are listed in one category with Reporters and Correspondents in some years. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System describes
Reporters and Correspondents as employees who “collect and analyze facts about newsworthy
events by interview, investigation, or observation” and “report and write stories for newspaper,
news magazine, radio, or television.” Broadcast News Analysts are employees who “analyze,
interpret, and broadcast news received from various sources.” The definition suggests Broadcast
News Analysts may also reveal or convey salient information to or generate attention from
investors. I include the category in my analysis both because of the possibility that they reveal
relevant information and to retain comparability throughout the sample period.
I calculate the percentage change to employees in the sum of these two categories across
two-year windows to account for the rolling nature of the survey. Years in which the number of
employees in the Reporters and Correspondents and Broadcast News Analyst categories falls 25
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percent or more from the OES survey released two years prior are identified as negative shocks to
coverage. The OES has released results of the metropolitan area-level survey since 1997; however,
the category descriptions have only been standardized since 2001, when the OES survey began
using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Prior data are based on the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Although the classification change is unlikely to
affect the particulars of this analysis, I limit observations of shocks to employment to 2003, as
measured by the difference from 2001, and beyond.

Sample description
The first, and largest number, of firms with negative shocks are recorded in 2003, as shown
in Figure 1, with more than 250 firms headquartered in geographic areas that were affected.
Reductions in media employment affected more than 100 firms in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and
2009. As Gao, Lee, and Murphy (2019) show, shocks to employment are not uniform across time.
In their sample, newspapers closed within counties at different periods, and they use the
introduction of Craigslist to a market as an instrument for a newspaper closure, because of the
ensuing loss of classified advertising revenue. Craigslist was founded in 1995 in San Francisco
and entered the largest metropolitan areas first, which suggests that cities with the headquarters of
a relatively larger number of publicly traded firms may have been affected earlier than other areas.
The last affected year considered in this analysis is 2015 to allow at least three years of post-shock
returns and accounting information. Figure 2 shows where affected firms are located, by state. As
is to be expected because of the number of firms headquartered in these states, the heaviest
concentrations are in California, New York, and Texas, but the firms included in my analysis span
41 states and Washington, D.C.
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The Metropolitan Statistical Areas used by the BLS are designated by the U.S. Census
Bureau. I link ZIP codes to MSAs using Census Bureau designations for 2010, and identify the
ZIP code of a firm’s headquarters using Compustat listings for its mailing address, because many
companies incorporate outside of the state where their operational headquarters may be located for
tax and governance reasons. To ensure that total changes in overall employment are not affecting
the results, I drop observations in which a 25% reduction in the sum of Reporters and
Correspondents and Broadcast News Analysts is accompanied by a reduction in overall
employment as recorded by the OES. By requiring that overall employment has not fallen by more
than 5 percent, 196 firms are eliminated from the analysis.
Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) find that the Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS)
explains stock return comovements better than Standard Industry Classification (SIC) and the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) classification systems, and Levi and
Welch (2017) find that firm market value strongly correlates with a firm’s beta and other market
model factor similarities when compared with other firms. I find exact matches for each sample
firm by year and by 6-digit G industry code, and then match, without replacement, by market value
within 15% and, because I am attempting to isolate the effects of idiosyncratic risk, within 15% of
the market beta of the treated firm’s calculated beta in the Fama-French Three Factor model
regressions. The Fama-French Three Factor model is:
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return to the firm i at time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is the return to

a value-weighted market portfolio, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is the difference of the return to small market value stocks

minus larger firms, and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is the difference between the return to high book-to-market stocks
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and low book-to-market firms. The error term, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , is the firm specific residual from the regression,
which measures the idiosyncratic risk of the firm as separate from the systematic risk factors
measured by 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 , 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 . Regressions use daily returns for firms and the value-weighted

market portfolio from the CRSP database, and daily returns to the small-minus-big and the highminus-low portfolios, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , are from the North American factor file on Kenneth
French’s website.

I eliminate firms with relevant missing control variable data from Compustat or CRSP and
firms with common stock share prices that closed the year trading under $2 to mitigate small
changes in share price driving high variation in returns. I also eliminate firms with fewer than 160
days of trading data available each year. My main findings are robust to a number of matching
procedures, including matching with one, five, or as many as possible control firms with
replacement and matching firms by their headquarter regions’ overall employment levels, rather
than beta, after matching by market value. I require that matching firms have not experienced a
reduction in media employment in the area in which they are headquartered in any firm-year during
the 13-year period for which each firm is analyzed. In the final sample used, it is not possible to
find a matching firm for 1,291 companies in my treated sample 5. I drop them from my analysis to
ensure that results are not driven by unusually small or large firms or those with unusual market
risk, as measured by market beta. When those firms are included in the analysis, results are
stronger 6 than reported here.
My final sample consists of 1,373 firms headquartered in locations that experienced media
employment reductions and their 1,373 matching control firms. Summary statistics for the treated

5

A similar number of firms are unmatched using other procedures.
Positive significant relationship in all years for overall standard deviation (p < 0.01 in five of seven years and p <
0.05 in two), and highly significant for all years in test of idiosyncratic risk (p < 0.01).

6
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firms and the control sample at the year in which the shocks to media employment are recorded
are presented in Table 1, Panel A and Panel B, respectively. By design, mean market values and
firm beta are nearly identical. Other statistics, including total assets and standard deviation of
returns, are also similar at year 0. The firms also appear well matched in respect to the mean and
median number of analysts following treated and control firms, and the R2 values from the FamaFrench Three Factor regressions is similar between both groups of firms.

Other variables
Annual beta and standard deviation estimates are calculated using daily price changes from
the CRSP database. Daily trading volume data and spread calculations from the daily high ask and
low bid are also taken from the CRSP database. Lagged monthly returns are calculated for each of
the 12 individual months prior to the year being evaluated. Market value, total assets and other
accounting information are taken from the Compustat database. Analyst coverage information is
from the IBES database. Google Trends data is from publically available data provided by
Alphabet, Inc., and downloaded using a script that queries http://trends.google.com/trends. Google
Trends provides a public Search Volume Index (SVI) of searched terms. The SVI for a search term
is a normalized number of a randomized sample of searches for that term on Google, scaled by its
time-series average against all search traffic for a region. 7 Google search, which accounted for
about 77 percent of all search traffic in the United States during the final year considered by Da,
Engelberg, and Gao (2011), made up 88.23% of all U.S. search traffic in 2019, according to
StatsCounter Global Stats estimates. 8

7

Google Trends allows searches by various geographic regions, including cities, states, countries, and globally. SVI
here measures search traffic in the United States.

8

https://gs.statcounter.com/
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As a measure of market power, I calculate a firm’s concentration as the percentage of
market share for each firm i in its six-digit GIC industry using the formula:

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑡𝑡

Where Si is firm i’s market share calculated as the Sales of firm i over total sales for all
firms available in the Compustat database in the same 6-digit GICS category as firm i and with
positive sales information.
To examine firms’ competitive environment, I measure competition intensity with the
widely used Herfindahl-Hirschman index:

𝑁𝑁

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖2
𝑖𝑖=1

Where S is the percentage of market share for each firm i in an industry, and HHIIND equals
the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in an industry listed in the Compustat database.
HHI has some limitations, as it only includes publically listed firms and therefore does not
reflect the market share of private businesses. It also may imperfectly reflect state or local
dynamics, in which a firm has near monopoly power in a region but does not have a significant
share of the national market, or cases of collusion among firms. However, it is widely used by
government agencies and in the finance literature (Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Hoberg, Phillips and
Prabhala, 2014), and Pavic, Galetic and Piplica (2016) show that HHI is largely equivalent to other
measures of firm concentration.
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METHODOLOGY
Standard deviation and idiosyncratic risk
My primary analysis consists of a dynamic difference-in-differences model that measures
the effect of shocks to media coverage on volatility of returns and the measure of idiosyncratic
risk. The dynamic DiD model allows effects on the dependent variables to be monitored for several
years after the shock, and my analysis examines six years after the shock is recorded. Because the
actual reduction in media employment may have happened two years prior to being reported in the
BLS data, I include the year before (year t = -1) the shock is recorded in my main reported
regression results. 9
After identifying a negative shock to media employment where a firm’s headquarters is
located as year t = 0, I collect market information and three-factor market model parameter
estimates for as many years t from -6 to +6 as are available. Control firms are matched as described
in Section 4 at t = 0 and corresponding information for years from t = -6 to t = +6 are matched to
return and accounting information available from CRSP and Compustat.
The model (1) calculates differences between firms that have experienced the media
employment shock and those that have not in each of the periods t ≥ -1, as well as controlling for
state- and year-specific fixed effects.
(1)
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

9

In unreported results to confirm the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-differences design, I test
treatment effect at all years t = -6 through t = +6 for each of the tests where the dynamic DiD is employed. The first
significant results appear no earlier than year t = -1.
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Because the dependent variables are associated with market trading, I follow Levi and
Welch (2017a, 2017b) who suggest that market value and lagged returns are the most important
determinants in market model specifications. I use the natural log of the firm’s market value to
normalize the values and calculate the lagged returns of each of the 12 months in the prior year
and use each month’s total as a control. I also include controls that may affect the information
environment of a firm, as compiled in Drake, Guest and Twedt (2014). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
argue that analysts play a monitoring role in managerial performance, and Moyer, Chatfield and
Sisneros (1989) and Chung and Jo (2016) find that analysts also keep markets informationally
efficient by meeting information demands of investors, and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012); find
analysts can reduce information asymmetry. Analyst Coverage is a dummy variable equaling 1 if
the firm has at least one estimate issued during the year (LaFond, 2005). The Index dummy variable
equals 1 if a firm is listed on the S&P 1500 because being included on the high-profile index could
both raise attention and scrutiny. I also include a firm’s book-to-market ratio as a relevant element
of an investors’ value and estimation risk assessment (Desai, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2004),
and lagged beta to further control for the systematic elements of risk realized in the prior year.

Dynamic difference-in-differences regressions
All standard errors, in model (1) and all other regression models employed in this paper,
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by OES area number (the level of assignment of
treatment) to address possible serial correlation in the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan, 2004).
There are several threats to validity when using the difference-in-differences method. The
first, conditional exogeneity, requires an assessment of the pre-treatment comparability of the
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treated and control samples. Figures 3 and 4, discussed fully in Section 6.1, demonstrate a similar
pattern of standard deviation of returns among the treated and control sample firms prior to
recorded media employment reductions, offering some assurance that the parallel trends
assumption is reasonable (also, see Footnote 14). In unreported results, I also matched firms on
levels of standard deviation in year t = -2 rather than market beta, and results in later differences
between the two groups are similar to those in my main findings.
Employing the difference-in-differences design also requires the assumption of no
systematic composition changes within nor between the treated and untreated groups (Blundell
and Costa Dias, 2009). The assumption of noninterference has been noted in textbooks
(Wooldridge, 2010) and numerous studies in economics (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996;
Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). This stable unit treatment value
assumption, or SUTVA, requires that treatment applied to one unit does not affect the outcome for
other units, either in the treated sample or in the control group.
In my setting, affected and unaffected firms are matched by industry, and therefore, are
likely competitors. If treatment affects some firms negatively (positively), those effects may
simultaneously benefit (hinder) competing firms within the same industry. In an analysis of
competition’s effect on idiosyncratic risk to firms, I find no evidence of such an effect; however,
this is a potential concern of the research design.
Another element of the SUTVA concerns treated firms affecting one another. In my
research design, treatment is assigned to firms at the metropolitan statistical area or other
geographic region used by the OES, and although the model includes controls for state effects, as
well as year effects, firm actions may affect other firms in the treated area. For example, one of
the potential causes of increased estimation risk may be the reduced levels of monitoring after a
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reduction in local media employment (see Chapter 3). Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2018) find
that city-level norms may be a factor in financial misconduct. If reduced monitoring allows one
treated firm to engage in financial misconduct, then norms may change for other firms in the
immediate area and potentially increase financial misconduct among all treated firms. If market
participants consider this risk as a reason to reassess their fair value estimates of securities, then
estimation risk may increase. To address this within element of the SUTVA, I reduce my sample
to only those firms with the highest market value in each area and their matching control firms.
Only 94 treated firms and their controls are left in this sample, and after matching year t = -6
through +6 information from Compustat and CRSP, a total of 1,677 firm-years are evaluated. The
reduced power from the smaller sample size leaves only two years post-treatment with a significant
two-way positive correlations (years t = +1 and +2, p < 0.1) with standard deviation of returns;
however, coefficients are directionally consistent and positive. To illustrate the effects of the
reduced power from this analysis, the coefficient on the effect of Analyst Coverage remains
negative, but is no longer significant, with absolute value of t statistics smaller than for any of the
post-treatment year coefficients.
The parallel trends assumption and the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption are
exclusion restrictions, and therefore cannot be confirmed using data or statistical inference.
However, I have little evidence that the assumptions obviously are being violated.

Measuring attention: SVI
Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) examine the SVI from Google search traffic for stock ticker
symbols for all Russell 3000 stocks. They find that (log) SVI is positively correlated with
alternative measures of attention such as extreme returns, turnover, and news. They determine that
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an increase in the weekly (log) SVI often precedes these alternative measures. They determine that
SVI captures the attention of individual retail investors, who are likely less-sophisticated
individual investors without access to specialized technology such as Reuters or Bloomberg
terminals available to professional traders. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) find that abnormal
levels of interest often result in temporary increases in valuation. I download SVI ratings for each
of my treated and matched control firms, as described in Data and Descriptive Statistics. I then
calculate abnormal SVI (ASVI), which is the difference between the median SVI during a year
and the average median SVI for the preceding three years; in regression analysis the ASVI is also
log-transformed 10. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use this measurement to capture unusual
amounts of investor attention and they find that it is tied to abnormal returns and trading activity.
Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find that increased attention is related
to increased trading volume, and Barber and Odean (2008) find that retail investors are more likely
to be net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks.
I report both overall levels of attention, as measured by SVI and ASVI, in Figure 6 and
Figure 7. In regression analyses, I analyze whether a reduction in media employment at a firm’s
headquarters is correlated with overall levels of attention (log of 1+ SVI) and abnormal levels of
attention (log of 1+ASVI), using the following OLS model:
(2)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
+ 𝛽𝛽4 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠

+ � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

𝑘𝑘

10

Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) calculate ASVI as the log-transformed difference between a firm’s SVI one week
and its median SVI for the eight weeks prior. Google only provides monthly SVI in the time frame I examine, and
my analysis is annual, so I use a modified calculation of ASVI. I also analyzed ASVI with two-year-prior average
median and one-year median. ASVI is essentially indistinguishable using these alternative methods.
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Where the dependent variable, Attention, is log-transformed SVI or ASVI. Treat is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm at year t has experienced a reduction in media employment in
the area where it is headquartered within the past six years. Advertising is advertising expenses
reported by a firm scaled by its overall sales 11. If firms offset the loss or reduction of one channel
of information to customers and investors by boosting advertising expenses, then those increased
advertising expenses may be positively correlated with attention levels. I include the interaction
term Treat*Advertising to further test this relationship. In this model, I use the log-transformed
number of analysts following a firm, calculated as the natural log of 1 + the number of analysts
following the firm, taken from the IBES detail summary. Other controls include the other
previously listed elements of a firm’s information environment: natural log of market value, a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is part of the S&P 1500, firm’s book-to-market, and returns
for the previous 12 months. The model also includes state-, year-, and industry-fixed effects.

Measuring attention: Volume of shares traded
To further test whether reduced attention drives the increase in idiosyncratic risk for firms
that experience a decline in local media, I examine overall trade volume over the pre- and posttreatment period. I return to the dynamic differences-in-differences model to test the relationship
between a firm experiencing a shock to its area’s media employment and the natural logarithm of
total volume of shares traded during the year. The model:
(3)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

11

𝑡𝑡

Missing values for advertising expenses are replaced with 0.
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Trades is the number of shares traded annually as recorded in Compustat, and is logtransformed to normalize the data and eliminate the effect of extreme values. Controls include
previously described variables intended to capture the information environment of the firm: firm
size, a dummy variable indicating whether at least one analyst covers the firm, a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a firm is part of the S&P 1500 index, and book-to-market. I also include prior 12month returns. I include the reciprocal of the closing price of the security at year t as share price
may influence the purchase and volume decision of some potential investors, particularly retail
investors. I also include advertising expense scaled by total sales because Grullon, Kanatas, and
Weston (2004) find that product market advertising can encourage investor activity.

Competition: Concentration and HHI
To assess whether a reduction in media employment near its headquarters has product
market consequences for a firm, I examine whether a firm’s market share, Si, is related to a
reduction in media employees in the area where a firm is headquartered. If local media provides
another advertising or marketing channel for firms, then firms may use advertising to offset the
loss of this channel. The OLS model (4) includes advertising expenses scaled by sales and an
interaction term to test directly whether firms that experience a shock to media employment use
advertising to offset the loss of that channel. The model is:
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

(4)
= 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

+ � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is market share as described in Data and Descriptive Statistics, Treat is a dummy

variable equaling 1 if a firm has experienced a reduction in media employment and time t = -1
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through 6, and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a firm’s advertising expenses scaled by the firm’s total sales.
Controls include the HHI of the firm’s industry, the total number of companies with the same 6-

digit GIC, the natural log of total employment in the firm’s geographic area, firm market-to-book
value, operating profit (EBIT) scaled by total sales, and the natural logarithm of total assets.
The HHI is included to indicate the potential for inter-firm efforts to maximize profits or
conversely for a firm to exert control over pricing by exercising its market power (Rhoades, 1995).
I also include the total number of firms within the industry, because for given levels of HHI, the
number of firms can vary and therefore the competitive environment may not be entirely reflected
in HHI. Area employment figures are included to reflect the available regional customer base,
which is most likely to be affected by local advertising or local media coverage as suggested by
Huberman (2001); Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004); and Barber and Odean (2008). Marketto-book and operating profit are measures of performance, intended to capture firm-specific
elements of managerial efficiency. Total assets and the market-to-book ratio reflect size and
current valuation.
The U.S. Department of Justice considers a market with an HHI of less than 1,500 to be a
competitive marketplace, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 to be moderately concentrated, and an HHI of
2,500 or greater to be a highly concentrated marketplace. According to the Justice Department, “as
a general rule, mergers that increase the HHI by more than 200 points in highly concentrated
markets raise antitrust concerns, as they are assumed to enhance market power under section 5.3
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines jointly issued by the department and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).” I follow the Justice Department guidelines to construct a subsample analysis
of firms in competitive marketplaces, moderately competitive industries, and highly concentrated
markets.
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Estimation risk: Bid-ask spread
To assess the risk of adverse selection for market-makers (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Kyle,
1985; Lee, Mucklow and Ready, 1993; Easley and O’Hara, 2004), I measure the quoted bid-ask
spread as:
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

𝐷𝐷

1
= � 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑
𝐷𝐷
1

The spread for each year, t, is calculated as the average of the sum of the daily high ask
price, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 , minus the daily low bid price, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 , divided by the number of trading
days, D, each year. The mean bid-ask spreads for treated and control firms from years t = -6 to +6

are shown in Figure 9. The regression uses the dynamic difference-in-differences design employed
in other tests with a model of:
(5)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

Controls include the log transformed price of the security, Price, taken at the end of the
calendar year reported in Compustat, the information environment dummy variables Analyst
Coverage and S&P 1500 Index dummy, and the average daily volume of shares trading during the
year, Trades. Per-share price has been shown to be positively correlated with the bid-ask spread
(Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Tinic and West, 1972; Benston and Hagerman, 1974). In this paper’s
research setting, price may be a particular concern because higher per-share prices may discourage
retail investors from entering the market for the security thereby improving liquidity for marketmakers and informed traders. The information environment variables (dummy variables equaling
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1 if any analysts cover the firm or if it is listed in the S&P 1500) are included to test the effects of
other known information intermediaries. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) find that marketmakers use both spread and depth to control their risk to adverse selection, so as an admittedly
coarse control for depth, I include the average daily volume of shares traded as the variable Trades.
Controlling for depth allows us to isolate the bid-ask spread as the information asymmetry element
of liquidity. I expect a positive coefficient on Price as relatively informed traders will make up a
higher proportion of the market for higher-priced securities and fewer noise traders will be
available to improve price information and liquidity and reduce adverse-selection risk for marketmakers. I expect negative coefficients on Analyst Coverage and Index Dummy as both sell-side
analyst coverage and being listed on the S&P 1500 raise the profile of a security and imply a higher
level of public information processing and monitoring. I make no prediction for Trades as both
decreased (increased) depth and increased (decreased) spread are elements of decreased
(increased) liquidity.

Estimation risk: Number of shareholders
To test the relationship among a reduction in media employment, the number of
shareholders and the bid-ask spread, I employ the OLS regression model:
(6)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 + 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

+ � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and Controls are as described previously; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable

equaling 1 if the firm has experienced a reduction in media employment where it is headquartered,
and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of common shareholders at the end of the year t from the CRSP
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database. My sample includes only firms (treated firms and their controls) from the period t = -1
to +3 to examine the near-term effects on the number of shareholders as it relates to reduced
potential media coverage.

RESULTS
Standard deviation of returns and idiosyncratic risk.
Figures 3 and 4 show the mean and median standard deviations of returns for firms that
experienced a 25% or more reduction in media employment in the areas where the companies are
headquartered. Both figures demonstrate a clear relative increase among firms that experienced
the shock to media employment after the reduction was recorded in year t = 0. Figures 5 shows the
mean values of the root mean squared errors from Fama-French 3 Factor regressions of daily
returns. The residuals can be interpreted as a direct measurement of the idiosyncratic risk of the
firms, and the separation between shock and control firms again is clear from the figure, although
the differences appear to begin in year t = 0, consistent with the reduction in media employment
actually occurring up to two years before it is reflected in OES data.
The results from the dynamic difference-in-differences regression on standard deviation of
returns, shown in the first column of Table 2, show significant positive correlations between a
reduction in media employment and the standard deviation of returns beginning in year t = -1 (p <
0.05) and strongest in year t = +1 (p < 0.01). The significant correlations continue until year t = +4
(p < 0.1). The results from the residuals from the Fama-French Three Factor regressions, shown
in the second column of Table 2, appear to affirm the correlation between idiosyncratic risk and a
reduction in local media employment, with the strongest correlation at year t = +3 (p < .01) and
continuing until at least year t = +6 (p < .1). Because one of the attributes firms were matched on
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was market beta, a measure of systematic risk, the results in Table 2 taken together suggest a
reduction in media employment creates frictions in attention, the product marketplace, or value
estimation that increases the idiosyncratic risk of firms. The signs on the variables intended to
capture other information environment factors of firms are all significant (p < 0.01) and signed as
theory suggests. Analyst Coverage and the S&P 500 Index dummy suggest reductions in standard
deviation of returns and idiosyncratic risk, as does firm size as measured by Market value.
Having established a correlation between a reduction in nearby media employment and a
firm’s idiosyncratic risk, I explore the three channels by which I hypothesize the firms may be
affected.

Attention: SVI, ASVI levels
Because Google data only extends back to 2004, the SVI analysis eliminates firms that
experienced a shock to local media employment in 2003, so 2,092 firms (treated and matching
controls) at year t = 0 are included in this analysis. My calculation of abnormal SVI requires three
years of lagged SVI information; therefore, firms that experience a shock to media employment
before 2007 are excluded from that analysis. That sample includes 1,462 firms at year t = 0. I first
present figures showing overall median attention levels as measured by SVI (Figure 6) and ASVI
(Figure 7) of firms that experienced a shock to media employment compared with control firms
from six years before the shock is recorded to six years after. Figure 6 shows that median attention
levels for firms that experience a shock stay steady before and after the reduction in media
employment. Curiously, control firms appear to build attention, as measured by SVI, over the
analyzed period. At six years before their matched firms experience a media employment
reduction, control firms have a considerably lower median SVI, about 7 compared with more than
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30 on the 100-point scale for “treated” firms 12. SVI, however, between firms is not directly
comparable, as an individual search term’s SVI can only be compared to its own prior search
traffic. However, the control sample firms, in aggregate, appear to be building attention over the
first half of the analyzed time period, while treated firms are not. This does not appear to be related
to shocks to media employment, however, as the trend among control firms is clear long before
any reductions in local media employment occurred, and the control firm series levels off around
the time of the shock to the treated sample. The differences in SVI among control firms and treated
firms during the year t = -6 to 0 period may be the result of additional media coverage prior to year
0 among the treated sample and therefore reflect more attention earlier. However, because SVI is
search-term specific, it may be the control sample that is benefitting from additional media
coverage while starting at a similar level of attention in year t = -6. The differences may, of course,
be unrelated to media coverage. What is demonstrable from Figure 6 is that there is no obvious
decline in attention as measured by SVI among the firms that experience a shock to local media
employment where they are headquarted.
Figure 7 presents a similar comparison of abnormal search attention (ASVI). The
increasing levels of attention experienced by the matching control sample is reflected in relatively
higher ASVI when compared with firms that experienced a media employment shock near their
headquarters. Years t = -1 through t = +2 look especially striking, which would include the periods
in which employment reductions occurred and immediately after. However, the numerical
differences between the two group’s median ASVI is relatively small, only 5 SVI at its most
extreme (with a possible maximum of 100). Importantly in analyzing whether shocks to media

12

Mean SVI indicates similar trends, with treated firms maintaining a fairly constant SVI and control firms’ SVI
increasing during the year -6 to year 0 period. Mean SVI, however, is consistently higher than median values, with
treated firms around 40.
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employment affect attention, the ASVI for firms that have experienced a shock to media
employment exceed the control sample ASVI in years 4, 5, and 6.
If increased idiosyncratic risk among firms that have experienced a reduction in local media
employment is the result of decreased levels of attention, then one would expect to observe
differences in levels of SVI and ASVI after the shock to local media employment occurred.
However, Figures 6 and 7 provide little evidence that the null for Hypothesis 2 can be rejected.
The figures demonstrate that a dynamic difference-in-differences design is inappropriate because
trends are clearly not parallel in the pre-treatment period. Instead, I use an OLS regression to
measure the independent variables’ correlation with firm levels of (log-transformed of 1+) SVI
and ASVI.

Attention: SVI, ASVI regression results
The results of OLS regressions, in Table 3, provide further evidence that increased
idiosyncratic risk cannot be attributed to declining levels of attention. The number of analysts,
market value and whether a firm is included in the S&P 1500 index are significantly positively
correlated with higher levels of attention, as measured by overall levels of SVI. This is consistent
with firms that receive more information channels having higher-attention stocks. Somewhat
surprisingly, advertising expenses appear to have a negative correlation with SVI, although the
relationship is not significant. Using both SVI and ASVI as the dependent variable, a dummy
variable indicating whether a firm has experienced a decline in local media employment within
the past six years is insignificant for SVI and significantly positive for ASVI (p < 0.01). In other
words, declines in local media employment are correlated with increased search traffic for firms
headquartered in the same area. The abnormal SVI may be explained by investors turning to online

35

sources for additional information about a firm as a substitute for local media coverage. And, as
noted, absolute values of ASVI are relatively small. However, the result provides clear evidence
that investors are not less aware, in the sense of the first condition of the Merton (1987) model, of
the investment opportunities. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that attention levels are
unchanged after a shock to local media employment. Advertising expenses are positively
correlated with ASVI (p < 0.1), and the number of analysts is significantly negatively correlated
with abnormal attention (p < 0.01). Analyst coverage may provide a relatively steady information
environment for investors and make firms less likely to suffer from the attention shocks measured
by ASVI or a significant number of investors may use analyst forecasts as a substitute for general
search queries. The S&P 1500 Index dummy is significant and positively correlated with ASVI,
perhaps because changes to the index of large, popular and heavily monitored stocks encourage
investors to seek out information about the index’s component securities.

Attention: Trade volume
Figure 8 shows mean trade volume in years t = -6 to t = +6 for firms that experience a
shock to media employment and their control firms. Both lines increase at similar slopes over the
period, suggesting no apparent differences in the patterns of trading volume between the two sets
of companies. The observed pattern also suggests the parallel trends assumption is not apparently
violated for the period from year t = -6 to t = 0, providing support for use of the dynamic differencein-differences model. The results from that regression test, in Table 4, suggest that the market
value, information environment, price, and return controls explain a significant portion of the
variance in trading volume (adjusted R2 = 72.68%). I find only lightly significant relationships to
some of the years after a reduction in local media employment affects the area where a firm is
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headquartered, and that relationship is positive. To the extent that a reduction in media
employment affects trading volume, it appears to be correlated with an increase, although not a
significant one. I again fail to reject the null hypothesis that a reduction in media employment
reduces attention as measured by trading volume.
As mentioned in Hypothesis Development, HFTs make up an increasingly important
source of trading activity. Despite the dynamic DiD model’s assumption that only the differences
between the two samples post-treatment and the pre- and post-treatment differences in the treated
sample are being captured, it is possible increased algorithmic trading creates a confounding trend
at a regional level unspecified in the model despite state- and year-fixed effects. For instance,
HFTs may begin to target stocks in certain regions persistently over several years, thus inflating
trading volume heterogeneously. To ameliorate this concern, I also control for linear state-specific
time trends by allowing an interaction between each state dummy variable and each identification
of year t from year t = -1 to t = +6. The regression model becomes:
(7)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

+ [� 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 ] + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡

Where all variables are the same as in model 3, with the addition of the State*Time t
interaction that creates an explanatory linear trend.
I employ a third model examining trading volume that allows both linear state-time trends
and quadratic state-specific time trends to capture the state-specific effects of HFT volume that
may be nonlinear. The regression model is:
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(8)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦
𝑠𝑠

𝑦𝑦

+ [� 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 ] + [� 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 2 ] + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡

Where all variables are the same as in model 3, the State*Timet interaction captures a
potential linear trend and the State*Timet2 allows for the effects of a quadratic trend.
The results for model 4 find a significantly positive relationship between trading and
treatment at year t = +2 (p < 0.1) and the coefficients are positive until year 4, where it is negative
but insignificant. The R2 in the linear-trend model improves less than half a percentage point.
Including the linear and nonlinear trends in model 8 yields an R2 of 78.12%, an improvement of
more than 5 percentage points, and while coefficients remain positive for years t = -1 to t = +3, as
in model 4, no significant relationships are detected in model 8.

Increased competition: Market share
Next, I consider firms’ competitive environment. If the loss of a channel of advertising and
marketing is eliminated or reduced, firms’ increased idiosyncratic risk may be related to declining
market power or increased competition. For this analysis, I only consider firms from years t = -1
to t = +3 for two reasons. 13 The first is that if there are effects on market share because of reductions
to a marketing channel, it is reasonable to assume those effects could be detected within three years
of the reduction. Including years beyond t = +3 introduces the possibility of capturing unrelated
effects on the longer timeline. The second reason is practical: Specific unemployment data before
13

Regression results that include the entire sample from years -6 to +6 using interpolated estimates of area
employment are indistinguishable from the -1 to +3 results.
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2001 is unavailable, so allowing the years t = -6 to t = -2 creates several observations with missing
independent variables.
Table 5 describes the changes to market share and industry HHI for firms in the treated and
control sample. The three columns sort sample firm-years into those which increased their market
share by more than 1%, stayed within +1% or -1% of last year’s market share, or had decreased
market share of more than 1%. The table also includes mean and median industry HHI for the
sample.
Table 6 shows regression results for a firm’s market share on the independent variables
described previously. A reduction in media employment, levels of advertising expense, and the
interaction between those two variables do not appear to be significantly related to a firm’s market
share. In fact, only the variables associated with firm size appear to correlate significantly with a
firm’s market power, as measured by share of industry sales. Therefore, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis that a reduction in media employment does not have a significant effect on the product
market share or competition levels.
Although the regression results indicate no significant relationship between a firm’s market
share and a reduction in media employment, the distribution of firms in Table 5 may indicate
disparate treatment effects that are lost when concentration is examined in pooled OLS. In Table
5, more than 40% of the matched-sample control firms have similar market share to the year before,
while only 7% of treated firms do. The treated firms with changes appear to be as equally likely to
gain or lose market share relative to the rest of their industries, and the constraint of +1% or -1%
are intentionally strict to approximate no change in market share. I examine subsamples using the
Justice Department categories for competitiveness to determine whether the competitive
environment plays a role in the increased idiosyncratic risks of the treated firms. None of the
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independent variables of interest are significant in any subsample. The adjusted R2 of the
regressions on the moderately competitive and concentrated subsamples are much higher (near
70%), implying the control variables are less effective in explaining market share in competitive
environments.

Estimation risk: Bid-ask spread
Having failed to reject the null hypotheses that declines in attention or increases in
competition are responsible for increased idiosyncratic risk of firms headquartered in areas with
reductions in local media employment, I turn to the third possible channel: estimation risk.
Market-makers are believed to optimize their positions by setting bid-ask prices that maximize
profits from liquidity-motivated traders and protect against losses from information-motivated
traders (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Kyle, 1985). And HFTs largely function as market-makers
(Menkveld, 2013). Information traders would include those with inside information, such as
managers. As the threat of adverse selection from informed traders increases, so does the bid-ask
spread set by market-makers. Increases in bid-ask spread can be the result of more informed traders
moving into the market for a security or the result of fewer liquidity, or noise, traders participating.
Both situations result in a higher proportion of informed traders and fewer opportunities for
market-makers to recover their information-driven losses (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).
The dynamic difference-in-differences model suggests that in years t = -1 to t = +6 after a
reduction in media employment is recorded in the area of a firm’s headquarters, the bid-ask spread
increases significantly (at p < 0.1 to p < 0.01) when compared with matching sample firms. Both
elements, awareness and agreement on fair value estimates, of the Merton (1987) and Klein Bawa
(1977) models imply this result. However, having found little evidence that awareness has
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declined, the increase in information asymmetry reflected in the bid-ask spread would appear to
be most likely the result of increased estimation risk. The control variables, particularly those
measuring the information environment, provide support for this conclusion. Both Analyst
Coverage and the S&P 1500 Index dummy have significantly negative correlations (p < 0.01) with
bid-ask spread, consistent with more uninformed traders participating in the market for the security
and implying that estimation risk does not prevent them from participating. An increased share of
noise traders allows market-makers to hedge their adverse-selection risk and keep bid-ask spreads
relatively lower. Price has a significantly positive (p < 0.01) correlation with bid-ask spread,
consistent with higher share prices limiting the role of noise traders in a security’s market. Trade,
which measures average daily volume traded and is used as a rough proxy for depth, also has a
significantly positive (p < 0.01) correlation with the quoted spread.

Estimation risk: Number of shareholders
Our final test examines the interaction term between a reduction in local media
employment, Treat, and the number of shareholders of a security, Holders. Both of the variables
individually are insignificant; however, the interaction term is significantly positive (p < 0.01) and
suggests that information asymmetry is increased for those firms with a relatively higher number
of shareholders and headquartered in an area that has experienced a reduction in media
employment. A higher number of shareholders suggests relatively fewer institutional investors and
relatively more uninformed or retail investors. Therefore, the results are consistent with increased
estimation risk from a local reduction in media employment most affecting retail investors.
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CONCLUSION
As the number of people employed as members of the media continues to decline across
the United States, the information environment for publicly traded firms may continue to be
affected. My findings suggest that effects of local media reductions on firm risk are significant and
persistent. After additional tests, the source of that idiosyncratic risk appears to be increased
estimation risk among investors, rather than decreased awareness about the investment
opportunities or real effects on firms’ product market competition.
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TABLES
Table 1.1, Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firms that experience shock to media employment

Summary statistics of firms identified with headquarters in Census Bureau statistical areas that recorded a
25% or more reduction in employment of Reporters and Correspondents or Brooadcast News Analysts over a twoyear period. Values are those from the time when the shock is recorded (at time t = 0). Beta is calculated using the
Fama-French Three Factor model.
N = 1,373
Market value*
Total assets*
3-Factor Beta
St. dev. returns
Mean spread
3-Factor R2
No. of analysts
Area employees

Mean

25th percentile

Median

75th percentile

St. Dev.

$1,421.77
$3,247.46
0.8377
2.6394%
$0.3507
24.39%
6.30
1,480,867

$136.50
$188.21
0.5054
1.8206%
$0.1606
6.65%
0
798,120

$438.52
$644.5
0.8987
2.4382%
$0.2751
22.15%
4
1,127,100

$1,242.82
$1,837.40
1.1547
3.2303%
$0.4406
37.28%
10
1,839,170

$3,673.63
$16,737.21
0.4674
0.0109
$0.3116
18.83%
7.05
1,197,639

* in millions

Table 1.2, Panel B: Descriptive statistics of control firms

Summary statistics of firms matched with those identified with headquarters in areas that recorded a reduction
in media employment over a two-year period. Firms are matched by year, market value, and beta from the FamaFrench 3 factor. Values are from the time when the shock is recorded for the matched, treated firm (at time t = 0).
N = 1,373
Market value*
Total assets*
3-Factor Beta
St. dev. returns
Mean spread
3-Factor R2
No. of analysts
Area employees

Mean

25th percentile

Median

75th percentile

St. Dev.

$1,434.40
$3,557.43
0.8377
2.6182%
$0.3370
24.68%
6.44
975,782

$139.23
$198.42
0.5027
1.8301%
$0.1567
6.59%
1
143,925

$423.50
$624.36
0.8924
2.4337%
$0.2608
21.94%
5
450,890

$1,214.81
$1,705.63
1.1625
3.2507%
$0.4135
38.00%
10
1,433,880

$4,599.65
$19,296.63
0.4689
0.0108
$0.4274
19.43%
6.78
1,186,725

* in millions
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Table 1.2: Measures of risk
The results from the dynamic difference-in-differences with state and year fixed effects. Two
measures of risk, overall standard deviation of log returns and the root mean squared error from
Fama-French 3 Factor regressions, are the dependent variables. Control variables include the log of
market value, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is covered by analysts, a dummy variable
indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P 1500, the log of the book-to-market ratio and lagged
beta. Variables year t = -1 to + 6 show the correlation with a reduction in media employment where a
firm is headquartered. Coefficients are significant at *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10

Independent variables

Standard deviation
of log returns

Mean-squared residuals
from 3 Factor regression

Market value

-0.0029***

-0.0033***

Analyst Cover

-0.0007**

-0.0008***

Index dummy

-0.0013***

-0.0014***

Book-to-market

-0.0015***

-0.0014***

Lag beta

0.0072***

0.0043***

Year t = -1

0.0007**

0.0005*

Year t = 0

0.0005*

0.0005*

Year t = 1

0.0008***

0.0005*

Year t = 2

0.0004

0.0003

Year t = 3

0.0008**

0.0006***

Year t = 4

0.0006*

0.0007**

Year t = 5

0.0004

0.0006*

Year t = 6

0.0006

0.0007*

State and year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

24,621
93.98%
93.96%

24,621
63.88%
63.75%

(t stat)

(-24.74)
(-2.49)

(-26.92)
(-3.15)

(-4.20)
(-6.76)

(39.62)

(-4.80)
(-7.02)

(22.73)

(2.20)

(1.84)

(1.90)

(1.76)

(3.36)

(1.95)

(1.52)

(1.24)

(2.53)

(2.71)

(1.65)

(2.30)

(1.08)

(1.85)

(1.23)

(1.61)
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Table 1.3: SVI and ASVI
The results from OLS regression of the dependent variables natural log(1 + SVI) and natural log(1+
ASVI) on a dummy variable indicating whether the area where a firm is headquartered has
experienced a 25% reduction in media employment, advertising expenditures scaled by total sales,
and control variables that include natural log(1 + the number of Analysts covering a firm), a dummy
variable variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P 1500, the log of the book-tomarket ratio and prior year returns. Asterisks indicate coefficients are significant at *** = p < 0.01;
** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10

Independent variables

ln(1+SVI)

ln(1+ASVI)

Treat

0.0066

1.8109***

Advertising expenditures

-0.1173

3.0530*

Treat*advertising expenditures

0.2039

-2.8213

ln(1 + Number of analysts)

0.1753***

-0.5573***

ln(Market value)

0.0701***

-0.1267

S&P 1500 index dummy

0.0976**

3.2230***

B2M

0.0095

0.2275

Prior year's returns

0.1143***

0.5990**

State, year, industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

18,490
86.52%
86.42%

12,930
13.26%
12.42%

(t stat)

(0.13)

(3.06)

(-0.37)

(1.84)

(0.60)

(-1.64)

(5.50)

(-2.87)

(3.12)

(-0.81)

(1.98)

(6.35)

(0.26)

(0.86)

(2.64)

(1.99)
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Table 1.4: Trade volume
Dynamic difference-in-differences with state and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
natural log of volume of shares traded. Control variables include reciprocal of share price at the end
of the year, advertising expenses scaled by total sales, the log of market value, a dummy variable
indicating whether a firm is covered by analysts, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is
included in the S&P 1500 index, the log of the book-to-market ratio, lagged beta, and prior year
returns. Variables year t = -1 to +6 show the correlation of a reduction in media employment where
a firm is headquartered with the outcome variable. Asterisks indicate coefficients are significant at
*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10sss

Independent variables

Ln(Annual volume of total
shares traded)

1/share price

0.8101***

Ad expense/sales

0.6991***

Market value

0.7337***

Analyst Coverage

0.1507***

S&P Index dummy

0.3201***

Book-to-market

-0.0934***

Lag beta

1.0323***

Prior year returns

-0.5154***

Year t = -1

0.0536

Year t = 0

0.0805*

Year t = 1

0.1271**

Year t = 2

0.1097*

Year t = 3

0.0924

Year t = 4

0.0483

Year t = 5

0.0539

Year t = 6

-0.0333

State and year fixed effects

Yes

(t stat)

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

(3.98)
(2.90)

(39.09)
(2.65)
(4.91)

(-3.41)

(28.88)

(-10.38)
(1.13)
(1.75)
(2.28)
(1.88)
(1.50)
(0.72)
(0.76)

(-0.45)
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24,636
72.77%
72.68%

Table 1.5: Market share & HHI
Table 5 shows concentration increases and decreases for firms that experienced a decrease in media
employment near their headquarters and a matching set of control firms. The columns indicate
whether market share (percent of industry sales) increased by more than 1%, stayed relatively the
same (between 1% increase and 1% decrease), or decreased by more than 1% percent.

> 1% concentration
increase
Number of firms
Percentage of firms in group
Mean firm % of market
Median firm % of market
Mean Industry HHI
Median industry HHI
Number of firms
Percentage of firms in group
Mean firm % of market
Median firm % of market
Mean Industry HHI
Median industry HHI

Same concentration
(between +1% and
-1%)

>1% concentration
decrease

3,027
51.10%
0.61%
0.13%
856
698

Treated firm-years from time t = -1 to +3
444
2,453
7.49%
41.41%
0.76%
0.57%
0.13%
0.09%
828
814
726
615

1,863
32.90%
0.75%
0.11%
881
731

Control firm-years from time t = -1 to +3
2,372
1,427
40.04%
25.20%
0.47%
0.65%
0.09%
0.08%
795
856
586
669
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Table 1.6: Market share regression results
The results from OLS regression of firm market share (% of total firm sales of total industry saless) on
a dummy variable indicated whether media employment has declined in the area where a firm is
headquartered, advertising expenses scaled by total sales, the HHI of the firm's industry, the total
number of people employed in the area, and firm market-to-book, operating profit, and log of total
assets. Asterisks indicate coefficients are significant at *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10s

Independent variables

Market share
% (total
sample)

Market
share %
(competitive
industries)

Market share
% (moderate
competition)

Market share
%
(concentrated)

Treat

0.0002

0.0002

0.0018

-0.0003

Advertising expenditures

-0.0012

-0.0008

-0.0144

-0.0131

Treat*advertising expenditures

0.0011

0.0010

-0.0453

-0.0127

HHI of industry

0.0002

0.0038

-0.0683

-0.0103

Number of firms in industry

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002

-0.0001

Log (No. employed in area)

-0.0001

-0.0001

0.0003

-0.0020

Market-to-book

0.0002***

0.0002***

-0.0003

0.0006***

Operating profit margin

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0003

0.0015

Log of total assets

0.0049***

0.0048***

0.0072***

0.0057***

State, year, industry FE

Yes

Yes

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

11,669
41.79%
41.13%

10,541
37.61%
36.88%

Yes
818
70.75%
67.88%

Yes
310
76.71%
70.26%

(t stat)

(0.44)

(-0.24)
(0.22)
(0.02)

(-1.44)
(-0.26)
(6.80)
(1.21)
(8.78)

(0.29)

(-0.14)
(0.18)
(0.23)

(-1.29)
(-0.17)
(6.92)
(1.20)
(8.78)
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(0.75)

(-0.84)
(-0.87)
(-1.59)
(-1.31)
(0.35)

(-0.52)
(-0.14)
(3.48)

(-0.09)
(-0.49)
(-0.40)
(-0.17)
(-0.78

(-0.94)
(1.14)
(0.39)
(4.85)

Table 1.7: Bid-ask spread
Panel A
The results from the dynamic differences-indifference with state and year fixed effects. Bid-ask
spread (annual mean of daily high bid minus low ask
divided by 2) is the dependent variable. Control
variables include the log of share price, a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a firm is covered by analysts, a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is included in the
S&P 1500, the natural log of total number of shares
available, and prior year monthly returns. Variables
year t = -1 to + 6 show the effect of a reduction in
media employment where a firm is headquartered.

Panel B
OLS regression for years t = -1 to +3 with state, year
and industry fixed effects. Bid-ask spread (annual
mean of daily high bid minus low ask divided by 2)
is the dependent variable. Independent variables of
interest are a dummy variable, Treat equal to 1 if the
area of a firm's headquarters experienced a reduction
in media employment and the log of number of
shareholders. Control variables include log of share
price, a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is
covered by analysts, a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
firm is included in the S&P 1500, and prior returns.

Independent variables

Bid-ask spread

Independent variables

Bid-ask spread

Price per share (log)

0.2724***

Treat

0.0045

Analyst Cover

-0.0560***

Holders

0.3528

Index dummy

-0.0760***

Treat * Holders

0.6626***

Mean daily volume

0.0265***

Price per share (log)

0.3215***

Year t = -1

0.0141*

Analyst Cover

-0.0653***

Year t = 0

0.0114

Index dummy

-0.0597***

0.0226*

Trades

(t stat)

Year t = 1

(15.76)

(t stat)

(-6.25)
(-6.21)
(7.02)
(1.83)
(1.32)
(1.94)

Year t = 2

0.0259*

Year t = 3

0.0362**

Year t = 4

0.0453**

Year t = 5

0.0344*

Year t = 6

0.0541***

(0.29)
(0.93)
4.89

(10.59)
-5.52
-4.97

0.0037
0.76

(1.83)
(1.99)
(2.06)
(1.67)
(2.76)

Fixed effects

State, year

Fixed effects

State, year, industry

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

26,406
66.96%
66.85%

Observations
R^2
Adjusted R^2

10,665
68.73%
68.31%

Asterisks indicate coefficients are significant at *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10
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FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Number of firms with negative shocks to media employment by year

Figure 1. The frequency of the years in which the negative shock to employment of
Reporters and Correspondents and Broadcast News Analysts occurred. From 2003 to 2015, 1,373
firms were identified as containing a shock to media employment in the geographic region in which
they are headquartered.
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Figure 1.2: Number of firms with negative shocks to media employment by state

Figure 2. The frequency by state/territory in which the negative shock to employment of
Reporters and Correspondents and Broadcast News Analysts occurred. From 2003 to 2015, 1,373
firms were identified as containing a shock to media employment in the Occupational Employment
Statistical area in which they are headquartered. The OES areas spanned 41 states and the District
of Columbia.
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Figure 1.3: Mean Standard Deviation of Returns

Figure 3: Mean standard deviation of log returns of firms that experienced a reduction in
media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered, recorded at year t = 0, and a
matching control sample of firms.

52

Figure 1.4: Median Standard Deviation of Returns

Figure 4: Median standard deviation of log returns of firms that experienced a reduction
in media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered, recorded at year t = 0, and a
matching control sample of firms.
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Figure 1.5: Residuals from Fama French 3 Factor model

Figure 5: Mean residuals from Fama-French 3 Factor regressions for firms that
experienced a reduction in media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered,
recorded at year t = 0, and a matching control sample of firms.
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Figure 1.6: Average Median Annual Search Volume Index

Figure 6: Overall levels of Google search traffic (SVI) for the ticker symbol of firms that
experienced a reduction in media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered,
recorded at year t = 0, and the ticker symbols for a matching control sample of firms. SVI is
measured on a scale of 0 to 100 and compares a search term’s popularity to total Google search
traffic for the period and region examined and to itself over time. SVI is measured by year in the
United States.
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Figure 1.7: Abnormal Search Volume Index

Figure 7: Abnormal levels of Google search traffic (ASVI) for the ticker symbols of firms
that experienced a reduction in media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered,
recorded at year t = 0, and the ticker symbols of a matched control sample of firms. ASVI compares
the SVI of the ticker symbol at year t to its median search traffic for the period t = -3 to -1. SVI is
measured by year in the United States.
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Figure 1.8: Median of Total Trade Volume of firms’ stocks

Figure 8: Trading volume of shares among firms that experienced a reduction in local
media employment nearby and control firms.
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Figure 1.9: Mean Bid-Ask Spread for Firms’ Stock

Figure 9: Average bid-ask spread among firms that experienced a reduction in local media
nearby and control firms.
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Chapter 2: Effects of local media reductions on returns, valuation, and debt
INTRODUCTION
Theory predicts that as investor attention declines or investor estimation risk increases
(Klein and Bawa, 1977; Merton, 1987), securities will deliver higher levels of returns. Consistent
with that, prior research has found that a lack of media coverage is associated with higher returns
(Huberman and Regev, 2001; Chan, 2003; Fang and Peress, 2009; Antweiler and Frank, 2011).
However, in the years following a reduction in nearby local media employment, I find that firms
appear to not only fail to deliver higher levels of returns but to actually have lower returns than a
set of peer firms that have not been affected by a reduction in media employment. However,
affected firms do appear to be more likely to issue debt and to pay a debt premium from lenders.
The effect on loan spreads is similar to the effect found for municipal governments in Gao, Lee
and Murphy (2019) in the municipal bond market after a newspaper in the county closes.
This paper begins by identifying whether the stock return effects of local levels of media
employment are similar to the effects of levels of “news coverage” as defined by Fang and Peress
(2009). I find similar return premiums for firms headquartered in areas with relatively lower
number of media employees when compared with those with a higher number of media employees.
The return premium is similar in magnitude to that found in Fang and Peress (2009) for securities
that received no coverage in four major national newspapers each month compared with those
identified as “high coverage,” i.e. being the subject of the highest number of articles in those
publications. As in Fang and Peress (2009), I construct long-short portolios of low “coverage”
firms and high “coverage” firms, where “coverage” in my setting is defined as the number of media
employees in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistical area where the
firm is headquartered. I assume that those journalists employed nearby the firm’s headquarters are
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most able and available to cover a firm (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Waldman, 2011; Gurun and
Butler, 2012; Call et al., 2018; Cage, Herve and Viaud, 2019). I find statistically and economically
significant differences in overall returns and alpha from the market model and factor index models,
consistent with the findings in Fang and Peress (2009) where “coverage” is defined by number of
articles.
Next, I construct a sample of firms that have experienced a 25% reduction in media
employment in the areas where they are headquartered to determine whether they experience the
implied required increase in returns. I find evidence of the opposite in the six years after the
reduction is recorded. In tests of valuation, market-to-book value is significantly positively
correlated with a decrease in local media employment. Both findings are contrary to economic
theory about investor attention and firm information environment and dissemination, which
suggest that investors demand a return premium in less “covered” firms and that valuation will
decrease as fewer investors participate in the market for a security (Klein and Bawa, 1977;
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Merton, 1987). In Essay 1, I find that the idiosyncratic risk of the
sample firms increases after a reduction in local media employment and an increased estimation
risk among investors is the likely reason. Theoretically, increased estimation risk has the same
consequences as decreased attention, and implies lower valuations and higher required returns
(Klein and Bawa, 1977).
Although I do not find a relationship between reduced media employment and returns,
reductions in local media employment do appear to be correlated with a change in the propensity
to issue debt and the spreads of those loans. Firms headquartered in areas that experience such a
reduction appear more likely to issue debt, and private lenders require higher spreads from them,
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even after controlling for prior leverage levels. These findings are robust to controlling for firm
characteristics, as well as other information environment factors and performance of the firm.

MOTIVATION
Most prior literature on media coverage and capital markets measures the numbers of
articles appearing about a firm 14 or the number of television segments 15. In representative
examples, Fang and Peress (2009) examine stories that appeared in four major national
newspapers; Engelberg, Sasseville and Williams (2012) count segments of Mad Money on CNBC;
Twedt (2016) counts the number of articles transmitted by the Dow Jones Newswires; and Fedyk
(2018) examines headlines published on the front page of Bloomberg News Terminals. However,
my research attempts to explore the effect of news that is not produced or published. Similar in
spirit to Gao, Lee and Murphy (2019) who examine newspaper closures, I explore whether a
reduction in the number of media employees in the area where a firm is headquartered affects
companies’ financing costs. Gao, Lee, and Murphy (2019) explore municipal financing and find
that the threat of government inefficiencies and informational frictions after a newspaper closure
leads lenders to demand higher yields. In the corporate finance realm, Antweiler and Frank (2011)
find that returns around firm-generated news are affected by whether the Wall Street Journal
reports on it, and Bushee et al. (2010) and Bonsall, Green, and Muller (2019) suggest that less
media coverage can increase information asymmetry and delay price discovery among both retail
and institutional investors. Bradshaw, Wang, and Zhou (2019) find that the number of news articles

14

Examples of research that examines print and online article publications include Pritamani and Singal (2001);
Dyck and Zingales (2002); Chan (2003); Fang and Peress (2009); Engelberg and Parsons (2011); Ahern and Sosyura
(2014); Fedyk and Hodson (2014); Peress (2016); Blankespoor, DeHaan and Zhu (2018); and Fedyk (2018)
15 Research focusing on television segments include Engelberg, Sasseville and Williams (2012); Aman, Kasuga and
Moriyasu (2018); Baloria and Heese (2018); and Peress and Schmidt, 2020).
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about a firm are positively associated with analyst revisions, and that the tone of those articles
predicts the direction of revisions. Guest and Kim (2019) also find that analysts and media play a
complementary role, with each reducing the costs of generating information about covered firms
for the other. Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) find that disclosures by business press have significant
effects on firm cost of capital and return volatility.
Media can also play a role in firm decisions, as they attempt to manage their reputation
capital (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010; Liu and
McConnell, 2013; Baloria and Heese, 2018), suggesting that firms with less potential for media
coverage may act differently than those subject to higher levels of media scrutiny. The lack of
media coverage may also influence investor behavior. Blankespoor, DeHaan, and Zhu (2018) find
that the appearance of articles produced by an algorithm and containing no information beyond
firm press releases increase trading activity and improve liquidity. Barber and Odean (2008) and
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find evidence of increased local trading when local media cover
nearby firms.
Collectively, those findings suggest that differences in levels of media coverage,
irrespective of actual articles, may be have similar effects to those of firm-level commitments to
disclosure. Healy and Palepu (2001) count the press, along with analysts, auditors, and others,
among the information intermediaries who can enhance the credibility of firm-produced financial
disclosures and help reduce the agency problem between investors and managers seeking funding
(Akerlof, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the predictions of the estimation risk
hypothesis of Klein and Bawa (1977) and the implications of the Merton (1987) attention
hypothesis, firms with higher levels of disclosure have been found to have lower costs of capital
than those firms with lower levels of disclosure and thus higher information risk (Healy, Hutton
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and Palepu, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002). Leuz
and Wysocki (2016) model a link between firm information quality and cost of capital and find
that it affects investment decisions and expected cash flows. And Miller and Skinner (2015)
suggest that media coverage influences management’s disclosure decisions. Significantly, Miller
(2006) shows that the media identifies almost one-third of fraud cases before they are announced
by the firm, suggesting investors and lenders can, to an extent, rely on media to encourage
disclosure. In the absence of outside information intermediaries, as Kothari, Shu and Wysocki
(2009) find, managers on average delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news, which has
implications for shareholders and lenders.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Klein and Bawa (1977) and Merton (1987) propose models in which investor attention has
implications for returns. Theoretically, investors are able to diversify away all idiosyncratic risk
by using the essentially infinite number of assets available to their portfolios; however, actual
investor portfolios are functionally limited to the assets with which investors are aware and for
which they can arrive at fair value assessments. Merton models “awareness” as both knowing
about a firm, i.e., that it exists an investment opportunity, and being able to properly assess
parameters that affect its operation, i.e. estimate its value. If investors are “unaware” of an asset,
either because they do not know that an investment opportunity for a firm exists or because they
cannot properly estimate its value, then it cannot be included in their portfolios. In Merton’s model,
firms have an optimal number of investors and limits to attention can prevent firms from reaching
that optimal number. For firms with a suboptimal number of shareholders, investors will require
higher returns because of the additional risk carried. The Merton model also predicts that as
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awareness increases and more investors buy securities in the firm, the value of the company will
increase.
Merton (1987) includes estimated valuations as an element of attention, but only includes
one level of information in his model. Klein and Bawa (1977) explicitly discuss the implications
of estimation risk among investors and suggest the effects would be similar to declining attention,
with risk-averse investors moving their investments away from assets with difficult-to-assess fair
values. The effect, as with declining attention, is reduced valuations and increased required returns
to the remaining investors, which is also consistent with increased information risk in the
disclosure literature (Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001). Lehavy and Sloan (2008)
find that decreased investor recognition, as determined by 13F filings, is linked to higher returns,
and dissemination and recognition appear to be even more important than earnings news in
explaining stock returns. Li (2015) finds that the most price-informative articles are produced by
journalists who rely most heavily on first-hand access to management, institutional investors, and
other experts. This suggests that local media employees may be uniquely positioned, by
geography, to reveal news about a nearby firm. Gurun and Butler (2012) consider this role of
journalists, but empirically find that local media are subject to “hype” when covering firms
headquartered nearby and tend to cover local firms with a positive slant because of the influence
of advertising relationships. In a survey of journalists, which includes several local and regional
news outlets in addition to national and financial press, Call et al. (2018) find that journalists
acknowledge pressure from management to avoid unfavorable stories, but that they consider
monitoring companies one of journalism’s most important functions.
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My first hypothesis considers whether local media employees have a similar impact on
returns as the well-established link between disclosure generally and the national and business
press specifically.

Hypothesis 1: Firms headquartered in areas with relatively fewer local media employees
will deliver higher returns than those firms headquartered in areas with relatively more local media
employees.

A reduction in media does not appear to produce a reduction in measures of attention;
however, it does appear to be associated with increased information asymmetry between investors
and the firm, and investors face higher levels of idiosyncratic risk (Essay 1). If those are priced
elements of valuation and returns, then returns should increase as valuation decreases.

Hypothesis 2a: Firms that experience a reduction in local media employment will deliver
higher returns and suffer valuation declines relative to a sample of control firms.

Idiosyncratic risk; however, is diversifiable and therefore may not be reflected in lower
valuations or higher returns. Hughes, Liu and Liu (2007) find no information asymmetry effect on
risk premiums, suggesting rather that the cost of equity is driven by betas and factor risk premiums.
Niessner and So (2018) find that financial news is more likely to focus on negative news, and
suggest that findings about abnormal returns around high and low coverage are the results of high
coverage firms experiencing negative returns rather than low coverage firms experiencing
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abnormally positive returns 16. And Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) find that firms can publicize
debt issuances to maintain valuations, essentially using lenders’ presumed access to proprietary
information to certify that a borrowing company is a safe investment. Therefore, I also state the
null hypothesis:

Hypothesis 20: Firms that experience a reduction in local media employment maintain
consistent or lower returns and consistent or higher valuations than a sample of control firms.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) outline agency problems between both managers and equity
holders, as well as agents and debt holders. Leland and Pyle (1977) also detail some of the
information risks faced by lenders. Smith and Warner (1979); Bushman and Smith (2001); Dichev
and Skinner (2002); Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2008); Zhang (2008); Nikolaev (2010); and Kim,
Song and Zhang (2011), among others, demonstrate that lenders use the spread of loans and
covenants to mitigate the risks associated with the information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers. Although little research has examined the role of the financial press in debt contracting,
several papers discuss the role of media and the auditing function, another information
intermediary that can certify a firm’s disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Mutchler, Hopwood
and McKeown (1997) and Joe (2003) find that media coverage can influence auditors’ goingconcern decision, and Gong, Gul and Shan (2018) find auditors charge higher fees for firms that
are the subject of higher levels of media coverage. Collectively, the findings suggest that auditors
may recognize an increased likelihood of disclosure of bad news that threatens the validity of their
audit opinions and increases their litigation risk. Importantly, increased media coverage is unlikely
16

This is in explicit contrast to Fang and Peress (2009), who find that increased returns to a portfolio long in No
coverage firms and short in High coverage firms are driven by the higher returns to the No coverage firms.
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to be associated with the existence of bad news; the risk, instead, is the result of media coverage
increasing the likelihood that extant bad news is revealed. Debt holders have incentives to discover
bad news about borrowers, but no agent can monitor all the events that are potentially relevant to
their decisions (Nimark and Pitschner, 2019). If lenders face decreased channels for such
discovery, they may charge a premium for their increased information risk.

Hypothesis 3: Firms that experience a reduction in local media employment face higher
interest rates (spreads) from lenders than a sample of control firms that also issue debt.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
BLS data
Information on the number of reporters and correspondents in an area is taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics program. The survey produces
annual estimates of employment for 810 specific occupations in more than 580 areas, including
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and nonmetropolitan areas throughout the U.S. states, the
District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. The statistics are compiled annually after each year’s
May survey and are released in March of the following year. The Metropolitan Statistical Areas
used by the BLS are designated by the U.S. Census Bureau. I link ZIP codes to MSAs using Census
Bureau designations for 2010, and identify the ZIP code of a firm’s headquarters using Compustat
listings for its mailing address, because many companies incorporate outside of the state where
their operational headquarters may be located for tax and governance reasons.
I use the total numbers of employees in the Reporter and Correspondent categories, which
include both the Publishing Industries, such as newspapers and periodicals, and the Radio and
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Television Broadcasting Industries. The employment total used in my analysis includes Broadcast
News Analysts, which are listed in one category with Reporters and Correspondents in some years.

Low-High coverage portfolios
I construct an equally weighted portfolio of firms, similar to the portfolios constructed in
Fang and Peress (2009). In their sample, firms are identified as No, Low, and High coverage firms,
based on articles that appeared in four major newspapers in the United States. Those newspapers
are the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today. The
majority of their firms fell into the No coverage category, with no stories appearing. Those firms
delivered significantly higher returns than the High Coverage firms, and the authors attribute the
differences to the higher returns required by investors to invest in lower-attention and less-liquid
securities. To assess whether local media employment produces a similar effect, I construct
portfolios based on terciles of the overall number of media employees in the geographic area where
a firm is headquartered. Firms in the lowest tercile are identified as Low coverage firms, and those
in the highest tercile are identified as High coverage. Because of the BLS data reporting schedule,
my portfolios are rebalanced annually. To generate comparable annual returns, I take the monthly
return and multiply it by the 12 months of the year 17. I then repeat a subsample analysis included
in Fang and Peress (2009). To demonstrate that effects are not driven by other firm characteristics,
I separate firms into portfolios based on terciles by firm size, book-to-market, and share price, and
analyze returns to each of those portfolios. Following Fang and Peress (2009), I eliminate firms
with a closing share price for the year under $5.

17

If I assume returns are compounded monthly, the returns to each portfolio are implausibly high, although
directionally consistent.

68

Following Fang and Peress (2009), I regress daily returns for an equally weighted longshort portfolio of Low Coverage-High Coverage firms on the market return using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, the Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor model, and the Carhart (1997) Four-Factor
model. The full four-factor model is:
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 is the return to the portfolio p at time t and 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk-free rate. The Fama-

French factors are 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 , the return to a value-weighted market portfolio; 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , the difference of the

return to small market value stocks minus larger firms; and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , the difference between the return
to high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market firms. The Carhart (1997) Four-Factor

model includes the Fama-French factors, as well as 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 — also known as the momentum factor

(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2002, 2011) — the difference in returns between the lowest pastperforming firms from the highest past-performing firms. The intercept, 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 , is interpreted as the

abnormal return to the portfolio. Regressions use daily returns for firms and the daily returns from
the value-weighted market portfolio from the CRSP database, and daily returns to the small-minus-

big, high-minus-low and positive momentum-minus-negative momentum portfolios, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ,

and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 are from the factor file on Kenneth French’s website.
Media reductions

Next, I create a sample of firms that have experienced a reduction in local media
employment. I calculate the percentage change to employees in a metropolitan area as the sum of
the two journalist categories across two-year windows to account for the rolling nature of the
survey. Years in which the number of employees in the Reporters and Correspondents and
Broadcast News Analyst categories falls 25 percent or more from the OES survey released two
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years prior are identified as negative shocks to coverage. 18 Because of changes to the survey,
observations of shocks to employment are limited to 2003, as measured by the difference from
2001, and beyond. 19
Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) find that GICS classifications explain stock return
comovements better than SIC and NAICS industry classification systems, and Levi and Welch
(2017a, 2017b) find that a firm market value strongly correlates with a firm’s beta and other market
model factor similarities when compared with other firms. I find exact matches for each sample
firm by year and by 6-digit G industry code, and then match, without replacement, by market value
within 15% and within 15% of the beta of the treated firm’s calculated beta in the Fama-French
Three Factor model regressions.
I eliminate firms with relevant missing control variable data from Compustat or CRSP and
firms with common stock share prices that closed the year trading under $2 to mitigate small
changes in share price driving high variation in returns. My final sample consists of 1,373 firms
headquartered in locations that experienced media employment reductions and their 1,373
controls. Available accounting and return information from Compustat and CRSP leave 24,532
firm-year observations across the 13 years from 2003 to 2018 considered.

18 The 25% cutoff is used because it closely approximates the employment reductions explored in Gao, Lee, and
Murphy (2019) when one of a county’s newspapers closes. Two of the examples mentioned in Gao, Lee, and Murphy
(2019) are the closure of the Denver Rocky Mountain News in Colorado and the Cincinnati Post in Ohio. Those
closures were reflected as 28% and 27%, respectively, losses in media category employment in the BLS data. Testing
other cutoff levels of 20% and 30% yield similar results to those reported here.
19 In 2003 and 2004, the OES was released twice, in May and November. I use the data released for the May survey
results to ensure the survey windows are consistent across years. In 2004, the overall number of Reporters and
Correspondents and Broadcast News Analysts were the same in both the May and November survey results.
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Other variables
Annual returns are calculated using daily price changes from the CRSP database. Lagged
monthly returns are calculated as the sum of daily log returns for each of the 12 individual months
prior to the year being evaluated. Market value, total assets and other accounting information are
taken from the Compustat database. Analyst coverage information is from the IBES database.
Information on debt issuance and terms, including spread and covenant information, is taken from
the Thomson Reuters DealScan database and linked by ticker symbol. The procedure provides
3,903 firm-year observations in which treated or control firms are identified as having issued debt.

METHODOLOGY
Returns, portfolios of Low-High media coverage firms
I use an unpaired t test to determine whether returns are significantly different from Low
coverage firms and High coverage firms. I use the same test for each of the subsample portfolios
based on size, book-to-market, and share price. I also conduct two nonparametric tests for
robustness, a Wilcoxon rank sum test between the Low and High coverage firms and a test of
median equivalence between the two sets of firms. I then calculate abnormal returns (the intercept,
or alpha, 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 ) to the long-short portfolio of Low-High coverage firms, employing the market model,

the Fama-French Three Factor Model and the Carhart (1997) Four Factor model, and determine
whether the intercepts are significantly different from zero.

Effects of reduction in media employment
I repeat the firm-level unpaired t test of overall returns to determine whether the difference
between returns for firms that experience a reduction in nearby media employees is significantly
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different than the control sample at each year t from -6 to +6, where t = 0 is the year in which the
reduction in media employment is recorded. I also conduct the two nonparametric tests for
robustness.
Next I employ a dynamic difference-in-differences test to determine whether a reduction
in the number of nearby media employees is associated with a significant difference in returns,
abnormal returns as measured by alphas calculated from the Fama-French Three Factor Model,
and valuation, as measured by market-to-book value. Figures 1 and 2 show median and mean
overall returns for the sample of treated and control firms at year t = -6 to +6. Although returns
vary considerably each year for both sets of firms, they appear to follow a consistent pattern, with
treated firms’ recording higher returns until year t = 0, when treated firm returns fall below control
firm returns for several years before recovering their t < 0 trend. The model (1) calculates
differences between firms that have experienced the media employment shock and those that have
not in each of the periods t ≥ -1, as well as controlling for state- and year-specific fixed effects.
(1)
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is annual returns, abnormal returns (alpha from the Fama-French Three

Factor model), and market-to-book value. Because the dependent variables are associated with
market trading, I follow Levi and Welch (2017a, 2017b), who suggest that market value of equity
and lagged returns are the most important determinants in market model specifications. I use the
natural log of the firm’s market value to normalize the values and calculate the lagged returns of
each of the 12 months in the prior year and use each month’s total as a control. I include the
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standard deviation of lagged returns as a control for risk. I also include controls that may affect the
information environment of a firm, as compiled in Drake, Guest and Twedt (2014). Analyst
Coverage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one estimate issued during the
year (LaFond, 2005). The S&P 1500 Index dummy variable is equal to 1 if a firm is listed on the
S&P 1500 because being included on the high-profile index could both raise attention and scrutiny.
I also include a firm’s book-to-market ratio as a relevant element of an investors’ value and
estimation risk assessment (Desai, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2004), and lagged beta to further
control for the systematic elements of risk realized in the prior year. I include accounting measures
of firm performance, as those may affect returns and valuation. ROA is net income scaled by book
value of assets, and ROE is net income scaled by book value of equity. The first variable indicates
efficient use of assets, and the second is a measure of delivered return to shareholders. All standard
errors, in model (1) and all other regression models employed in this paper, are robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustered by OES area number (the level of assignment of treatment) to
address possible serial correlation in the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).

Debt spread terms
To explore the cost of debt, I employ a dynamic difference-in-differences design with the
minimum spread in basis points of each loan facility recorded in DealScan for my matched sample:
(3)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡
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I use four models, each including different controls. The first model uses controls typical
in prior literature for firm and loan characteristics (Bharath, Sunder and Sunder, 2008). The firm
characteristics included are market-to-book value, tangibility, leverage, and the current ratio.
Market-to-book value, calculated as the market value of the firm at the end of the year over the
book value of its assets, is an indicator of growth prospects. Tangibility is the accounting value of
property, plant, and equipment over total assets; leverage is long-term total debt over total assets;
and the current ratio is current assets divided by current liabilities. Each of the three provides
different measures of liquidity that lenders use to assess a borrower’s ability to repay the loan.
Loan characteristics are the amount of the loan facility and the maturity of the loan, both logtransformed, and a dummy variable indicating whether the facility includes a performance pricing
provision. In addition to spread, lenders can use loan amounts and maturities to mitigate the risk
of default. Performance pricing provisions allow lenders to increase spreads when financial
performance deteriorates to the point in which a covenant violation occurs and provide another
mechanism for lenders to mitigate risk (Smith and Warner, 1979; Dichev and Skinner, 2002).
My second model includes atypical debt controls for the information environment of the
firm. Although the informativeness of accounting quality in lending decisions is well-documented
(Francis et al., 2005; Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010; McNichols
and Stubben, 2015), other external monitoring of the firm has been less typical in the literature.
Because the role of external information intermediaries are central to the research question here, I
include controls for two sources of external monitoring that are well-established in the literature
in regards to returns. Analyst coverage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one sell-side
analyst has issued an earnings report for the firm, and the S&P 1500 Index dummy variable is
equal to 1 if the firm is included in the highly watched index.
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My third model includes controls for performance of the firm during the year the loan
facility is issued. Earnings is net income scaled by market value of the firm, and return on assets
is net income scaled by total assets. The fourth model includes all of the previous explained
controls, including the controls for firm and loan characteristics, information environment, and
contemporary firm performance.

RESULTS
Abnormal returns related to coverage levels
The number of reporters and broadcast analysts in a metropolitan statistical area offers no
evidence whether a firm was written about in a major newspaper. However, portfolios constructed
of firms with the lowest number of overall media employees and the highest deliver similarly high
returns (both economically and statistically) as portfolios constructed of No Coverage and High
Coverage firms reported in Fang and Peress (2009). In their paper, No Coverage firms are defined
as those with no articles about them during the month, while Low and High Coverage firms are
determined by whether the number of articles about a firm are below or above the median number
of total news articles about firms.

Univariate results, returns
I use an unpaired t test to determine whether returns for Low coverage firms are
significantly different from High coverage firms. The Low coverage firms are significantly higher,
as shown in Table 1. In panels A-C, I use the same test for each of the subsample portfolios based
on size, book-to-market, and share price. I also conduct two nonparametric tests for robustness, a
Wilcoxon rank sum test between the Low and High coverage portfolios and a test of median
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equivalence between the two portfolios, shown in Panel D and E of Table 1. In the case of the full
sample, results are consistent with the findings in Fang and Peress (2009) between Low (No)
coverage firms and High (High) coverage firms. The Low coverage firms (the middle tercile) in
Fang and Peress (2009), however, often delivered anomalously high (when compared with the No
coverage firms) or low (when compared with High coverage firms) returns. In my sample, the
effect of coverage appears to be more linear, with Middle coverage firm returns falling between
the other two terciles of firms. The results suggest that sorting firms by local media employment
captures a similar effect to the more traditional definition of coverage based on article counts
documented in Fang and Peress (2009).

Regression analysis
Next, I explore whether the media effect holds in constructing long-short portfolios based
on number of media employees located in the same area as a firm’s headquarters. Again following
Fang and Peress (2009), I compute the monthly return on a zero-investment portfolio that longs
the stocks with the lowest number of media employees and shorts the stocks with the highest
number. Fang and Peress constructed their portfolios based on longing the No coverage firms and
shorting the High coverage firms. The returns to the portfolio for each month yield a time series
of returns for the zero-investment portfolio. The time-series returns are then regressed on factors
known to affect the cross-section of returns. I examine three of the factor models in Fang and
Peress (2009): the capital asset pricing model, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
Using my full sample of firms from 2003 to 2018, the results, shown in Table 2, are
directionally consistent with the results in Fang and Peress (2009). The intercept (interpreted as
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the abnormal return to the portfolio) is not significantly different from zero in my regressions,
whereas it is significantly positive in Fang and Peress (2009). A subsample of the portfolio returns
from 2003 to 2009 finds significant positive returns (p < 0.05) to the long-short media strategy and
coefficients are similar to those reported in Fang and Peress (2009). It is possible the gains to the
No coverage portfolio have been largely arbitraged away since the 2009 publication; however, the
values of the coefficients on the media employment portfolios are actually larger than the annually
adjusted coefficients in Fang and Peress (2009) while the R-squared for each model is considerably
lower. Blitz (2019) finds that the widely used Fama-French factors delivered consistently negative
returns from 2010 to 2019, while other, less common factors, delivered positive premiums.
Therefore, comparing the results of the models may be inappropriate across these particular time
frames. Fang and Peress’ (2009) sample was from 1993 to 2002. In Fang and Peress’ sample, HML
had a significantly positive relationship (p < 0.01) with returns in the three- and four-factor models,
and UMD was significantly positive (p < 0.01) in the four-factor specification. Neither of those
factors were significant in my full sample tests; however, the SMB factor was positive in both my
tests and Fang and Peress (2009), and HML was significant (p < 0.05) in my sample that considered
only 2003-2009.
The Fang and Peress (2009) results are somewhat suspect in light of the results in Gurun
and Butler (2012), who find that media coverage is essentially captured by advertisers and is
subject to short-term reversal. Any negative return to High Coverage firms in the Fang and Peress
(2009) sample, which is determined monthly, could be driven by those reversals. My results, in an
annual setting, support the Fang and Peress (2009) conclusions that investors require higher returns
from firms with less coverage, however “coverage” is defined.
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After a reduction in media employment
The univariate t tests and nonparametric tests, shown in Table 3, find little evidence that
returns are significantly different between the firms that experienced a reduction in nearby media
employment and their controls after the reduction in media employment is recorded. Consistent
with Figures 1 and 2, treated firms have consistently higher mean and median returns in the years
prior to the reduction in media employment, significantly higher at years t = -3 and -4 (p < 0.1 for
means and p < 0.05 for medians). No significant differences are found after the media reduction is
recorded, although in many years the control firms’ mean and median returns are higher.
Nonparametric tests, a Wilcoxon rank sum test and a test of the equality of medians, support these
findings.
In the dynamic difference-in-differences results only year t = 2 shows a significant
relationship (p < 0.05) between a reduction in media employment and returns and abnormal
returns, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. The negative correlation is the opposite of that predicted
by attention and estimation risk models, which suggest that valuations will fall as current
shareholders at the margins will move their investments away from the security and new
shareholders will not know to invest or will decline to bear the added estimation risk. The
remaining shareholders are predict to demand higher returns as additional risk premia. The marketto-book value has a significant positive relationship at years t = 1 (p < 0.05), t = 2 (p < 0.01), and
t = 3 and 4 (p < 0.1). Again, this is the opposite direction predicted by attention and estimation risk
models. Together, the results of the univariate tests and the dynamic difference-in-differences test
provide support for the null, Hypothesis 20 rather than the affirmative, Hypothesis 2a.
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Cost of debt
Univariate results
A reduction in media employment may not show the predicted decrease in valuation and
increase in returns because the firm-level return effects are limited to idiosyncratic risk, which can
be diversified away, or because firms take other measures to maintain valuation and return levels
such as issuing debt (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011). Lenders also face adverse selection risks
and use loan term spread to mitigate their risk from their asymmetrical information with managers
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Dichev and Skinner,
2002; Zhang, 2008; Kim, Song and Zhang, 2011). Auditors appear to recognize that media
coverage can uncover bad news (Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown, 1997; Joe, 2003; Gong, Gul
and Shan, 2018), and lenders may charge additional risk premia, through increased spreads, when
that external monitoring function is reduced.
I identify 3,903 firms in my treated and control samples with a debt issuance recorded in
DealScan. Unpaired t tests between control firms and treated firms, reported in Panel A of Table
5, find no significant differences in the means of the spreads in the years t = -6 to +1 around a
reduction in local media employment at year t = 0. However, in years t = +2 and +3, treated firms
have significantly higher average spreads (p < 0.1 and p < 0.05, respectively). Nonparametric
analysis, in Table 5, Panel B, finds significantly higher median spreads for treated firms at years t
= +1, +3 and +5 (p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the mean
and median spreads for treated and control firms from year t = -6 to +6.
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Dynamic difference-in-differences
I employ four models, shown in Table 6, to examine the relationship between a reduction
in media employment and spreads. Model (1) includes controls for firm and loan characteristics
typically related to spreads, which are divided by 1,000 to allow coefficients to be interpreted as
percentages. Market-to-book value and loan size are negatively correlated with spreads, as is the
dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan includes a price performance provision that allows lenders
to increase the spread if performance falls below a certain threshold. Firm leverage and loan
maturity are positively correlated with spreads. The variables of interest, year dummies for years
t = -1 to +6 around the reduction in media employment, are significant at years t = +1 through +3
(p < 0.05, p < 0.1, and p < 0.01, respectively). Year t = +2 and +3 are significantly positively
correlated in all specifications and year t = +1 in all but the model (3) that includes performance
measurements. Models 2 and 4 include other controls related to the information environment of
the firm. Being included in the S&P 1500 index (p < 0.01) and analyst coverage (p < 0.05) are
significantly correlated with lower spreads in model 2, which does not include performance
measurements. Inclusion in the S&P 1500 is significantly negatively correlated with spreads in
model 4, as well. This is consistent with lenders using information or certification from outside
sources, as well as their private information from borrowers, to mitigate their risk.

Additional tests
Capital structure theory predicts that firms should prioritize equity financing to issuing debt
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) to avoid adverse selection problems or that firms have a target capital
structure that balances various costs (Graham and Leary, 2011). Despite evidence that firms that
experience a reduction in nearby media employment do not face an increased cost of equity, I
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found no instances of seasoned equity offerings in my sample using the CRSP distribution dataset.
Even if overall valuations had increased, Welch (2004) finds that U.S. corporations do not issue
and repurchase debt and equity to counteract the mechanistic effects of stock returns on their debtequity ratios.

Debt ratios and debt issuance
I employ one of the measurements, debt-to-equity ratio, common in the finance and
economics capital structure literature. A firm’s debt ratio is calculated as its book value of debt
over the sum of its book value of debt and its market value of equity:

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =

𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

Where 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is equal to the sum of short-term and long-term debt for firm i at time

t, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of shares outstanding at the end of time t and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the share price. Figure 5
shows the mean debt ratios for treated and control firms; however, no pattern is evident, and the
pre-treatment trends indicate a difference-in-differences is an inappropriate statistical tool.
To estimate a firm’s financing decisions, instead I employ the full sample of firms that
experienced a reduction in local media employment and their controls to estimate a probit model
on a firm’s decision to issue debt, where the outcome variable is set to 1 if a facility loan appears
in the DealScan database and 0 otherwise.
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡
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Where Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is in year t > -1 and is headquartered
in area that has experienced a media reduction. I include controls for the firm’s level of cash, scaled
by total book value of assets (CASH); operating income before depreciation, scaled by assets
(OIBD); capital expenditures, scaled by assets (CAPEX); market to book value (MTB); the logtransformed value of sales (Sales); book leverage, defined as book debt scaled by assets; research
and development expenditures, scaled by assets (RD); a dummy variable for missing values of
R&D (RDD) 20; the difference between the raw returns of the firm one year prior and the year-ago
returns to the value-weighted market portfolio recorded in the CRSP database (Adj. returns); and
firm age (Age). Firms with more cash and higher profitability are less likely to seek external
financing. Growth firms, as measured by capital expenditures, higher market-to-book values, R&D
expenditures, and firm returns, are more likely to seek external financing. Age is included because
older firms are less likely to require external financing. Financial statement information is taken
from the Compustat database; adjusted returns are calculated using information on firm returns
and returns to the value-weighted market portfolio from the CRSP database; and Age is calculated
as the year of the firm-year observation minus the year a market value first appeared for the firm
in Compustat. Missing values in Compustat leave 24,982 firm-year observations in my analysis.
Table 7, Panel A reports the results of the probit regression. Treat is significantly positive
(p < 0.01), suggesting firms are more likely to issue debt after a reduction in media employment.
The marginal effect of a reduction in media employment on a debt issuance decision is 1.9% at the
mean. I also estimate a logit regression to include fixed effects for state, year, and industry, as each
of these may play a role in the borrowing environment and financing decisions of firms. The
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Following Huang and Ritter (2009), I set R&D equal to 0 if the value is missing in Compustat, both to preserve
the sample and because generally no value recorded indicates a firm has not invested in R&D. However, to control
for any variation explained by firms that may not record R&D expenses, Huang and Ritter include a dummy
variable, RDD, equal to 1 if the value of R&D expense is missing, which I also employ here.
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results, reported in Table 7, Panel B, are similar to the probit model, with Treat again showing
significantly positive correlation on the debt issuance decision (p < 0.01). The marginal effect of
a reduction in media employment is 2% at the mean.

CONCLUSION
Overall, lower levels of media coverage appear to be consistent with models that predict
investors will require higher returns. The relationship appears robust to a variety of definitions of
“coverage.” In Chan (2003), “coverage” is the number of corporate press releases picked up by the
Dow Jones News Wires. In Fang and Peress (2009), “coverage” is the number of articles that
appear in four national newspapers. In Engelberg and Parsons (2011) “coverage” is articles in local
newspapers. Here, I define “coverage” as the number of media employees nearby and able to cover
a firm. The effects on firm valuations, returns, and risk appear similar across definitions.
However, a reduction in the number of media employees (i.e., a reduction in coverage)
does not appear to affect returns in the predicted way. Local investors tend to overweight their
portfolios with local stocks and are more likely to buy than sell (Huberman, 2001), which may
hold prices and returns steady. Even though as shown in Essay 1, firm-specific risk increases after
a reduction in local media employment, more sophisticated investors may be able to diversify that
risk away. Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) suggest firms can use debt to “certify” their disclosures
and improve share prices by announcing the loans.
Although firms that experience a decrease in media coverage, as defined here, do not
appear to face increased costs of equity capital, the costs of debt capital appear to rise, even after
controlling for leverage. Despite this increased cost of debt financing and steady or reduced costs
of equity capital, firms that experience a reduction in media coverage appear more likely to opt to
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issue debt. The puzzling finding is not explained by current attention or investor estimation risk
models, nor is it obviously explained by capital structure theory.
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TABLES
Table 2.1: Media Coverage and Stock Returns: Univariate Comparisons
This table presents average monthly returns for stocks with low and high numbers of media employees in the
geographic area where they are headquartered and repeats the results of No Coverage and High Coverage firms in
Fang and Peress (2009), FP. The table also shows the difference between Low (No) and High (High) returns and the
results of a t-test of the differences between the means. Panel A-C presents the same analysis for select subsamples
based on terciles of firm size, book-to-market, and share price, with 1 being the largest market value firms and 3 being
the smallest, etc. Panels D and E present nonparametric tests of the differences in returns for the full sample.
Average No. of
stocks

Average Annual Return
t-statistic
for LowHigh

Low (No)

High

Low (No)

High

LowHigh

All stocks by number of media employees

10.37%

6.56%

3.82%

7.21

795.56

775.00

FP annual return (monthly return X 12)

16.20%

11.52%

4.68%

2.13

1,430.08

245.40

Panel A: By Size
1 By Number of Media Employees

9.91%

4.01%

5.90%

5.88

236.00

311.63

2 By Number of Media Employees

10.16%

6.80%

3.37%

3.58

271.25

249.63

3 By Number of Media Employees

10.94%

9.99%

0.95%

1.19

288.00

213.44

1 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

16.92%

6.36%

10.56%

1.74

578.55

17.98

2 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

16.08%

8.28%

7.80%

2.68

514.23

46.71

3 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

15.24%

13.20%

2.04%

1.03

337.42

149.19

Panel B: By Book-to-market
1 By Number of Media Employees

21.44%

18.32%

3.13%

2.56

254.13

174.94

2 By Number of Media Employees

10.65%

9.12%

1.53%

1.67

242.13

182.44

3 By Number of Media Employees

0.88%

0.97%

-0.10%

-0.09

252.13

184.00

1 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

14.28%

10.44%

3.84%

1.25

441.79

81.50

2 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

14.76%

6.48%

8.28%

3.13

450.03

74.64

3 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

17.04%

14.28%

2.76%

0.85

460.78

70.57

Panel C: By Price
1 By Number of Media Employees

21.44%

18.32%

3.13%

2.56

254.13

174.94

2 By Number of Media Employees

10.65%

9.12%

1.53%

1.67

242.13

182.44

3 By Number of Media Employees

0.88%

0.97%

-0.10%

-0.09

252.13

184.00

1 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

12.12%

-1.32%

13.44%

3.14

545.18

35.76

2 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

16.68%

6.48%

10.20%

3.77

500.77

60.14

3 FP annual return (monthly return x 12)

21.24%

16.20%

5.04%

2.62

384.13

128.21

Panel D: Wilcoxon rank sum test of differences
All stocks by number of media employees

Low median

High median

Rank sum Z score

8.90%

5.00%

8.29

Panel E: Test of median equivalence
Low
High

Pearson chi^2

All stocks below median

5,973

6,592

97.73

All stocks above median

6,756

5,808

P(medians equal) < 0.001
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Table 2.2: Media-Related Trading Profits
Panel A of this table shows the profitability of a trading strategy that longs stocks with the lowest number of media
employees in the firm’s area by tercile and shorts stocks with the largest number of media employees. Both the long and
short positions are equally weighted, and portfolios are rebalanced annually. The resulting time-series returns on the
long–short portfolio are regressed on widely accepted risk factors. Panel B highlights results from Fang and Peress
(2009) shows the profitability of a trading strategy that longs stocks with no media coverage (no articles in four
publications) and shorts stocks with high media coverage (above the median of firms that had any articles written about
it). Both the long and short positions are equally weighted, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The resulting timeseries returns on the long–short portfolio are regressed on widely accepted risk factors. Coefficients in the Fang and
Peress (2009) sample have been adjusted to reflect compounded annual returns from the monthly portfolios.
Panel A: Low-High coverage portfolios based on media employment

Mkt-rf
SMB

Model (1)
2003-2018
CAPM
5.362**
(2.636)

Model (2)
2003-2018
3 Factor
1.977
(2.861)
14.431***
(4.790)
1.749
(4.361)

0.138
(0.107)
192
0.021

0.138
(0.105)
192
0.067

HML
UMD
Alpha (intercept)
Obs.
R-squared

Model (3)
2003-2018
4 Factor
2.684
(2.964)
14.129***
(4.803)
3.200
(4.640)
2.448
(2.666)
0.133
(0.105)
192
0.072

Panel B: No-High coverage portfolios in Fang and Peress (2009)

Mkt-rf
SMB

Model (1)
FP
CAPM
-0.844***
-

Model (2)
FP
3 Factor
-0.779***
43.489***
4.814***
-

0.055**
119
0.11

0.043**
119
0.58

HML
UMD
Alpha (intercept)
Obs.
R-squared

Model (3)
FP
4 Factor
-0.682***
14.129***
39.108***
1.427***
0.029**
119
0.62

Standard errors are in parenthesis in Panel A; Standard errors not
reported in Fang and Peress (2009)
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Model (1)
2003-2009
CAPM
-15.315***
(2.847)

Model (2)
2003-2009
3 Factor
-18.442***
(3.257)
1.740
(5.579)
11.438**
(4.741)

0.250**
(0.123)
84
0.261

0.236*
(0.121)
84
0.311

Model (3)
2003-2009
4 Factor
-18.836***
(3.555)
1.894
(5.638)
11.029**
(4.980)
-0.729
(2.556)
0.235*
(0.122)
84
0.312
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Table 2.3: Test of differences in returns for treated, control firms at year t
Table 3 shows results of parametric (Panel A) and nonparametric tests (Panel B) of differences between average returns
for a sample of firms that experienced a 25% media reduction in the area in which they were headquartered and a
control sample of firms matched on 6-digit GICS industry category, year, market value and market beta from FamaFrench 3 Factor model regressions. Year t = 0 is the year in which the reduction to media employment was recorded.
Panel A: Unpaired t tests

Year t = -6
Year t = -5
Year t = -4
Year t = -3
Year t = -2
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Control
859
925
992
1,078
1,173
1,264
1,373
1,279
1,135
991
800
685
599

Treated
887
952
1,024
1,082
1,158
1,256
1,373
1,324
1,245
1,170
1,008
908
824

Control
Avg. ret.
-.009
-.053
-.006
-.105
.025
-.044
.055
-.036
-.025
-.097
-.102
-.085
.046

Treated
Avg. ret.
.013
-.048
.034
-.061
.030
-.043
.051
-.032
-.047
-.106
-.099
-.083
.047

Diff
-.022
-.005
-.04
-.043
-.005
-.001
.003
-.004
.022
.009
-.003
-.002
-.001

St_Err
.022
.024
.022
.023
.021
.020
.018
.019
.018
.021
.026
.029
.024

t value
-1
-.25
-1.75
-1.9
-.25
-.05
.2
-.25
1.25
.4
-.1
-.05
0

p value
.313
.815
.079
.058
.788
.966
.861
.82
.209
.686
.922
.941
.985

Panel B: Two-sample Median Equivalence, Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test

Year t = -6
Year t = -5
Year t = -4
Year t = -3
Year t = -2
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Control
859
925
992
1,078
1,173
1,264
1,373
1,279
1,135
991
800
685
599

Treated
887
952
1,024
1,082
1,158
1,256
1,373
1,324
1,245
1,170
1,008
908
824

Control
Med. ret.
.022
-.009
.017
-.028
.066
.034
.060
.041
.017
-.001
-.008
.030
.100

Treated
Med. ret.
.032
.004
.058
.002
.074
.042
.072
.040
-.009
-.008
-.012
.024
.093
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Pearson
Chi-square
.1123
.1543
3.1754
2.9630
.3606
.1016
.1763
.0464
1.4165
.1037
.0807
.0755
.3761

P(equal)
.738
.694
.075
.085
.548
.750
.675
.830
.234
.747
.776
.783
.540

Rank
sum Z
-0.724
-0.540
-2.125
-2.049
-.0421
-0.224
-0.251
-0.302
1.406
0.448
0.421
0.397
0.175

p value
.469
.589
.033
.041
.674
.823
.802
.763
.160
.654
.674
.692
.861

Table 2.4: Regression results on returns, alpha, and market-to-book
The results from a dynamic difference-in-differences model with state and
year fixed effects. Two measures of returns, overall (1) and abnormal
returns as measured by the intercept from Fama-French 3 Factor
regression (2), and market-to-book value (3) are the dependent variables.
Variables Years t = -1 to + 6 show the correlation between a reduction in
media employment where a firm is headquartered and the outcome
variable.
(1)
Returns
0.056***
(0.006)
-0.131***
(0.010)
-0.117***
(0.011)
-0.426**
(0.192)
0.491***
(0.120)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.052***
(0.008)
0.177
(0.590)

(2)
Alpha
0.021***
(0.002)
-0.069***
(0.004)
-0.043***
(0.004)
-0.155**
(0.075)
0.181***
(0.047)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.018***
(0.003)
0.026
(0.223)

(3)
MTB
-0.356***
(0.077)
0.411***
(0.092)
-1.841***
(0.201)
12.289***
(3.216)
-4.551***
(1.338)
-0.257***
(0.095)
-0.187**
(0.078)

-0.003
(0.017)
0.011
(0.013)
-0.024
(0.017)
-0.027**
(0.013)
0.004
(0.014)
-0.013
(0.016)
-0.011
(0.017)
0.021
(0.015)

0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.010
(0.006)
-0.010**
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.005
(0.006)

0.131
(0.096)
0.148
(0.122)
0.232**
(0.115)
0.212***
(0.075)
0.249*
(0.131)
0.170*
(0.096)
0.149
(0.115)
0.076
(0.115)

Obs.

24,532

24,532

24,533

R-squared
Adj. R-squared

0.356
0.354

0.204
0.202

0.701
0.700

Year fixed effects
State fixed effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Market value
Lag market beta
Book-to-market
ROA
ROE
Analyst Coverage
S&P 1500 Index
Lag S.D. of returns
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

89

Table 2.5: Tests of differences between loan interest rates for treated, control firms
Table 5 shows results of parametric (Panel A) and nonparametric tests (Panel B) of differences between loan interest
spreads for firms that took loans, taken from a sample of firms that experienced a 25% media reduction in the area in
which they were headquartered and a control sample of firms matched on 6-digit GICS industry category, year, market
value and market beta from Fama-French 3 Factor model regressions. Year t = 0 is the year in which the reduction to
media employment was recorded.
Panel A: Unpaired t tests

Year t = -6
Year t = -5
Year t = -4
Year t = -3
Year t = -2
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Control N
150
159
157
155
143
170
157
176
128
167
137
122
101

Treated N
172
208
241
234
244
241
234
289
276
248
228
204
209

Control
avg. spread
158.81
172.84
159.08
172
189.72
187.74
179.64
186.24
181.4
184.75
176.4
187.68
187.55

Treated
avg. spread
171.97
161.72
162.5
173.08
178.73
182.41
195.69
203.81
212.13
212
192.52
210.14
190.66

Diff
-13.15
11.12
-3.42
-1.08
10.98
5.33
-16.05
-17.57
-30.73
-27.25
-16.12
-22.46
-3.11

St. Err.
19.55
17.73
15.47
13.57
15.95
14.07
14.46
12.36
17.1
12.96
13.09
14.56
10.24

t value
-.65
.65
-.2
-.1
.7
.4
-1.1
-1.4
-1.8
-2.1
-1.25
-1.55
-.3

p value
.5
.53
.83
.94
.49
.7
.27
.16
.07
.04
.22
.12
.76

Panel B: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, Median Equivalence

Year t = -6
Year t = -5
Year t = -4
Year t = -3
Year t = -2
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Control
150
159
157
155
143
170
157
176
128
167
137
122
101

Treated
172
208
241
234
244
241
234
289
276
248
228
204
209

Control
median
spread
115.825
125
125
150
150
175
165
165
150
150
150
150
162.5

Treated
median
spread
150
162.5
132.5
145
138.75
150
150
175
160
200
165
175
175
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Pearson
Chi-square
.4915
.0321
1.5685
.4091
.0279
.4127
.3125
.7818
.07503
11.1861
2.5028
8.6984
.1413

P(equal)
.483
.858
.210
.522
.867
.521
.576
.377
.386
.001
.114
.003
.707

Rank
sum
Z score
-0.546
0.193
-0.826
0.168
0.682
0.701
-0.106
-1.696
-1.033
-2.030
-0.978
-2.676
-0.630

p value
.5852
.8471
.4087
.8668
.4950
.4833
.9159
.0899
.3018
.0424
.3279
.0075
.5289

Table 2.6: Loan spread of firms that experience media-related shock, controls
Results of dynamic differences-in-differences with state and year fixed effects. Loan facility spreads, the dependent
variable, are taken from DealScan and matched with a sample of firms that experienced a reduction in media
employment in their geographic areas and a sample of control firms. Variables Years t = -1 to + 6 show the effect of a
reduction in media employment. Model 1 includes standard firm and loan characteristic controls. Model 2 includes
previous controls and dummy variables representing the information environment of the firm. Model 3 controls for firm
performance. And Model 4 includes both information environment and firm performance controls.
(1)
Analyst Coverage

(2)
Information
Environment
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.049***
(0.009)

(3)
Performance
Measures

-0.222***
(0.045)
-0.004***
(0.001)

(4)
Info &
performance
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.043***
(0.008)
-0.202***
(0.045)
-0.003***
(0.001)

-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.012)
0.187***
(0.025)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.023***
(0.006)
0.036***
(0.007)
-0.067**
(0.031)

-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.012)
0.169***
(0.026)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.017***
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.007)
-0.047
(0.029)

-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.175***
(0.020)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.005)
0.038***
(0.007)
-0.085***
(0.020)

-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.160***
(0.021)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.006)
-0.067***
(0.020)

0.006
(0.011)
0.016
(0.014)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.019*
(0.010)
0.032***
(0.011)
0.001
(0.010)
0.005
(0.013)
3903

0.010
(0.011)
0.017
(0.014)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.020**
(0.010)
0.032***
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
0.012
(0.013)
3903

0.007
(0.011)
0.010
(0.012)
0.016
(0.010)
0.016*
(0.009)
0.026**
(0.010)
0.004
(0.010)
0.002
(0.013)
3903

0.010
(0.011)
0.011
(0.012)
0.017*
(0.010)
0.018**
(0.009)
0.027***
(0.010)
0.006
(0.011)
0.009
(0.013)
3903

0.729
0.724

0.738
0.733

0.741
0.736

0.747
0.742

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Standard

S&P 1500 Index
ROA
Earnings
MTB
Tangibility
Leverage
Current ratio
Log loan size
Log loan maturity
Price changes
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Obs.
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Year fixed effects
State fixed effects

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Likelihood of Debt Issue After Media-Related Event
The results from an estimation of the probability a firm decides to issue debt, where the outcome variable
is set to 1 if a facility loan appears in the DealScan database and 0 otherwise. The full sample of firms that
experienced a media employment reduction in their geographic area and a set of control firms are
included, and Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced the media reduction and the firm
year is after the reduction in media employment. Panel A reports the results of a probit model that
includes controls for characteristics associated with debt issues, and Panel B reports the results of a logit
model that includes state, year, and 6-digit GICS industry fixed effects.
P(Debt issue)
Treat
OIBD
CAPEX
MTB
Sales
RDD
RD
Adjust returns
Age
Constant

Coef.
0.070***
0.221**
1.411***
-0.022**
0.261***
-0.055**
-0.188
0.122***
0.002**
-2.631***

Mean dependent var
Pseudo r-squared
Chi-square

P(Debt issue)
Treat
OIBD
CAPEX
MTB
Sales
RDD
RD
Adjust returns
Age
Constant

Panel A: Probit model
St.Err. t-value
p-value
0.020
3.44
0.001
0.103
0.140
0.010
0.007
0.024
0.297
0.026
0.001
0.054
0.180
0.121
2119.934

2.14
10.05
-2.19
37.33
-2.25
-0.63
4.77
2.47
-49.15

0.032
0.000
0.028
0.000
0.024
0.528
0.000
0.013
0.000

SD dependent var
Number of obs
Prob > chi2

[95% Conf
0.030

Interval]
0.110

0.019
1.136
-0.042
0.248
-0.102
-0.771
0.072
0.000
-2.736

0.423
1.687
-0.002
0.275
-0.007
0.395
0.172
0.003
-2.526
0.384
25,291
0.000

Panel B: Logit model with year, state, and industry fixed effects
Coef.
St.Err. t-value
p-value
[95% Conf
Interval]
0.140***
0.036
3.92
0.000
0.070
0.210
0.743***
0.216
3.43
0.001
0.319
1.167
2.392***
0.248
9.63
0.000
1.905
2.878
-0.064***
0.020
-3.25
0.001
-0.103
-0.025
0.458***
0.012
36.83
0.000
0.434
0.483
-0.128***
0.045
-2.88
0.004
-0.216
-0.041
-1.221*
0.704
-1.74
0.083
-2.601
0.159
0.226***
0.047
4.82
0.000
0.134
0.318
0.003***
0.001
2.63
0.009
0.001
0.005
-4.544***
0.100
-45.66
0.000
-4.739
-4.349

Mean dependent var
Pseudo r-squared
Chi-square

0.180
0.123
2199.794

SD dependent var
Number of obs
Prob > chi2

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.384
25,291
0.000

FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Annual median returns

Figure 1: The annual median returns of firms that have recorded a 25% or more reduction
in local media employment in the geographic area where the companies are headquartered at year
t = 0 and a sample of control firms matched on market value and systematic risk (market beta from
the Fama-French 3 Factor model).
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Figure 2.2: Annual average returns

Figure 2: The annual average returns of firms that have recorded a 25% or more reduction
in local media employment in the geographic area where the companies are headquartered at year
t = 0 and a sample of control firms matched on market value and systematic risk (market beta from
the Fama-French 3 Factor model).
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Figure 2.3: Mean spread

Figure 3: Mean spread from facility loans reported in DealScan for firms that have
recorded a 25% or more reduction in local media employment in the geographic area where the
companies are headquartered at year t = 0 and a sample of control firms matched on market value
and systematic risk (market beta from the Fama-French 3 Factor model).
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Figure 2.4: Median spread

Figure 4: Median spread from facility loans reported in DealScan for firms that have
recorded a 25% or more reduction in local media employment in the geographic area where the
companies are headquartered at year t = 0 and a sample of control firms matched on market value
and systematic risk (market beta from the Fama-French 3 Factor model).
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Figure 2.5: Average debt ratios

Figure 5: Mean debt ratios for firms that have recorded a 25% or more reduction in local
media employment in the geographic area where the companies are headquartered at year t = 0
and a sample of control firms matched on market value and systematic risk (market beta from the
Fama-French 3 Factor model).
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Chapter 3: Effect of local media reductions on firm meet-beat behavior,
CEO turnover, and CEO compensation
INTRODUCTION
Theory and research suggest that media may play a monitoring role to constrain corporate
activity 21, and journalists believe that one of their most important functions is uncovering
mismanagement and financial malfeasance (Call et al., 2018). However, few have examined the
role of local media specifically, and what research does exist suggests that local media may be
more important for raising attention than conveying price relevant information about firms (Barber
and Odean, 2008; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011) or may even serve as marketers more than
monitors because of advertising relationships (Gurun and Butler, 2012).
I examine metropolitan areas in the United States that have experienced a reduction in local
media employment, according to an annual survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Firms headquartered in those geographic areas show an increased propensity to report earnings per
share that demonstrate discontinuity, consistent with earnings management to meet or beat
consensus analyst estimates, year-ago EPS, and reporting zero or just-positive earnings. I also find
abnormal discretionary accruals, commonly employed as a measurement for managed earnings
(Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Ball, 2013), increase for firms headquartered in
areas that experience a reduction in media employment when compared with a matching set of
control firms.
In addition to behavior consistent with earnings management, I find some evidence that in
the years after a reduction in local media employment, CEOs are less likely to experience turnover

21

Examples include Dyck and Zingales (2002); Miller (2006); Core, Guay and Larcker (2008); Dyck, Volchkova
and Zingales (2008); Joe, Louis and Robinson (2009); Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010); Kuhnen and Niessen
(2012); and Liu and McConnell (2013).
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and more likely to have higher levels of pay and percentage change increases. The change in pay
appears to be driven by profiting on stock and options, consistent with managers using their inside
information to profit after a reduction in monitoring and reputational risk that could accompany a
reduction in media employment.

MOTIVATION
Healy and Palepu (2001) count media among the information intermediaries — which also
include financial analysts, rating agencies and auditors — that engage in private information
production to uncover managerial misuse of firm resources and thereby mitigate agency problems
that arise from the separation of ownership and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Dyck,
Morse and Zingales (2010) examine where corporate fraud allegations originate and find that the
media is one of the most important actors in detecting fraud, accounting for more eventual
investigations than the SEC, auditors, private litigation, or debt and equity holders.
Miller (2006) finds that the press fills a dual role in revealing accounting fraud, both
rebroadcasting information from analysts, auditors, and lawsuits and by providing new information
and analysis that uncover accounting irregularities. Dai, Parwada, and Zhang (2015) also find
media play a role in corporate governance by disseminating news about insider trading profits,
which effectively reduces both overall trading and future profits by corporate insiders. Rogers,
Skinner, and Zechman (2016) also study insider trading information and find media play an
important role in market reaction to information, even when that information is publically available
before media reporting. More broadly, Li, Ramesh and Shen (2011) find that newswires help
investors identify news and trade on that information even though SEC reports were previously
available to the public.
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Nyhan and Reifler (2015) find the threat of fact-checking can constrain lawmakers’
willingness to engage in potential falsehoods, and several researchers have found a willingness
among firms to change their behavior, as well, to manage their reputational capital in the face of
media scrutiny (Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales, 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Baloria and
Heese, 2018). Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008) find that media coverage can encourage firms
to reverse corporate governance violations. Baloria and Heese (2018) find that firms are willing to
delay the release of negative information if they fear the loss of reputational capital from slanted
news sources. And Liu and McConnell (2013) find that differences in media tone and attention
can affect managers’ decision to abandon value-reducing acquisition attempts. Liu and McConnell
(2013) conclude that the risk to managers’ reputational capital levied by media exposure can help
align agent and shareholder interests. Niessner and So (2018) demonstrate that the media
prioritizes publicizing negative news about firms, consistent with journalists’ priorities as detailed
in the Call et al.’s (2018) survey of members of the press.
Collectively, the above research demonstrates that media, considered broadly, can play an
important role in constraining financial mismanagement through the threat of exposure. However,
most prior research focuses on national or international news sources, such as the Wall Street
Journal (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002); Dow Jones news releases (Li, Ramesh and Shen, 2011; Dai,
Parwada and Zhang, 2015); or major broadcast networks such as Fox News (Baloria and Heese,
2018). It is unclear whether local media exert similar reputational risks to managers and firms.
Local and regional newspapers appear to drive retail investor trading activity (Barber and Odean,
2008; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011); however, little evidence exists that local media serve as
effective corporate monitors, even if their geographic proximity to managers and employees
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provides added opportunities to detect and reveal financial mismanagement (Gurun and Butler,
2012).
Gao, Lee, and Murphy (2019) show that a reduced threat of local media exposure can mean
increased borrowing costs for municipal governments. Consistent with Gao, Lee, and Murphy,
Essay 2 demonstrates a similar effect among corporate borrowers. In Essay 1, I demonstrate that
firms experience increased idiosyncratic risk after reductions in local media employment, and find
evidence consistent with increased levels of information asymmetry driving the change rather than
reductions in attention or changes to the competitive environment.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Despite changes to the media landscape, in which a variety of online and other digital
sources may serve as substitutes for traditional journalists, Waldman (2011) and Cage, Herve and
Viaud (2019) find the most information still originates with local and regional newspapers and
broadcast networks. If even the threat of exposure of evidence of agency conflicts constrains
managers’ ability or willingness to engage in such activity, then a reduction in local media
employment may be associated with increased levels of behavior consistent with financial
mismanagement. In the auditor fraud triangle (Creesey, 1973), the risk of fraud is associated with
three conditions: perceived financial pressure, rationalizations for engaging in potentially
fraudulent activity; and the perceived opportunity to avoid detection. A reduction in the number
of local media members available to monitor a firm likely impairs their ability to effectively
discover information about a firm and could potentially increase the “perceived opportunity” by
managers to engage in behavior that is misaligned with shareholder interests.
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Earnings management
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) and Healy (1985) detail many reasons managers
may have incentives to manage earnings, including an array of employment opportunities and
compensation benefits. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) survey executives and find that
managers set smooth earnings reports as a high priority. Further, they find that a majority of
managers are willing to destroy firm value to achieve favorable earnings reports. Leuz, Nanda and
Wysocki (2003) suggest that managers engage in earnings management to protect their benefits of
private control.
If a significant number of managers manipulate earnings to just avoid reporting a loss, then
the earnings distribution will be discontinuous at zero, with unusually many few small losses and
unusually many small profits. If some managers just avoid year-over-year earnings decreases, then
a similar discontinuity arises for earnings changes (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Managers may
also avoid just missing a consensus analyst forecast (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999).
In the context of the fraud triangle, managers may interpret a reduction in local media
employment as an increased opportunity to avoid detection of earnings management.

Hypothesis 1: Discontinuity around standard earnings benchmarks will increase for firms
headquartered in areas that experience a reduction in nearby media employment.

Discretionary accruals
I next explore one of the common mechanisms for managing earnings, the use of accruals
to temporarily boost or reduce reported income. Accruals are components of earnings that are not
reflected in current cash flows, and a great deal of managerial discretion goes into their
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construction. Beneish and Vargus (2002) demonstrate that abnormal accruals can predict insider
trading activity by managers, and this evidence of earnings management at least partially explains
the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000). Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) provide evidence that abnormal discretionary accruals are more pronounced for
firms with CEOs who have greater compensation incentives to meet earnings benchmarks. As with
the meet-or-just-beat earnings incentives, if a reduction in local media provides executives an
increased opportunity to adjust accruals with reduced perceived risk of detection, then increased
measurements of abnormal accruals would be positively correlated with being headquartered in an
area that experienced a media employment reduction.

Hypothesis 2: Firms headquartered in areas that experience a reduction in media
employment will demonstrate higher relative levels of discretionary accruals.

Executive turnover
Lowenstein (1996) argues that the presence of potential media coverage can encourage
corporate boards to be more effective because of the threat that shareholders might respond to
negative press coverage by selling their shares, thereby reducing market value. Negative media
coverage of firm performance could also affect director reputations and create incentives for
directors to remove the CEO in an effort to salvage their reputations (Farrell and Whidbee, 2002).
Miller (2006); Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008); and Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010) find
that media coverage can expose managerial and governance problems at firms. Considering the
relationship between CEO turnover and media coverage, Farrell and Whidbee (2002) find that the
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volume of negative coverage in the Wall Street Journal is correlated with an increased probability
of CEO turnover.
If the threat of media exposure of financial mismanagement and the reputational risks to
managers and directors is lower after a reduction in local media employment, then CEOs may face
less likelihood of being fired or forced to resign.

Hypothesis 3: The probability of CEO turnover is reduced after a reduction in local media
employment in the area where the firm is headquartered.

Compensation
Kuhnen and Niessen (2012) find that media coverage of executive compensation can affect
both compensation levels and structure. They find that negative press coverage focuses especially
on stock options, and that reductions in option compensation are more severe when managers and
directors face higher levels of reputational risks. Core, Guay and Larcker (2008) find that the press
monitors excess compensation, and that it is more likely to focus on large stock and option
elements of executive compensation. However, they find that firms do not change compensation
in response to press coverage. Dai, Parwada and Zhang (2015) find that disseminating news about
insiders’ trading activity can effectively constrain both the volume and the profitability of future
trading. If a reduction in local media decreases a potential channel for disseminating information
about levels of compensation and trading activity, then managers of firms headquartered in areas
that have experienced a reduction in the number of journalists able to disseminate that information
may be able to more effectively increase their compensation levels and profitability of trading.
This leads to hypotheses 4 and 5:
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Hypothesis 4: CEOs of firms headquartered in areas that have experienced a reduction in
media employment will see relatively higher levels of compensation than chief executives of a
matching control sample.

Bhojraj et al. (2009) find that CEOs of firms that exhibit meet-or-just-beat behavior
consistent with earnings management and those with poor-quality accruals are more likely to
engage in insider selling of their company’s stock and options because they understand the
potentially firm-value-destroying nature of their actions. If managers face reduced monitoring and
reputational risk after a reduction in nearby media employment, levels and changes in pay should
be driven by sales of stock and options.

Hypothesis 5: Increased executive pay for firms that have experienced a reduction in
media employment in their area will be reflected more in calculations of compensation that include
actual profits from stock and option sales rather than estimates of value reported by the firms to
the SEC.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Bureau of Labor Statistics data
Information on the number of reporters and correspondents in an area is taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics program. The survey produces
annual estimates of employment for 810 specific occupations in more than 580 areas, including
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and nonmetropolitan areas throughout the U.S. states, the
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District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. The statistics are compiled annually after each year’s
May survey and are released in March of the following year. I use the total numbers of employees
in the Reporter and Correspondent categories, which include both the Publishing Industries, such
as newspapers and periodicals, and the Radio and Television Broadcasting Industries. I calculate
the percentage change to employees in the sum of these two categories across two-year windows
to account for the rolling nature of the survey. Years in which the number of employees in the
Reporters and Correspondents and Broadcast News Analyst categories falls 25 percent or more
from the OES survey released two years prior are identified as negative shocks to coverage. 22
Observations of shocks to employment are limited to 2003, as measured by the difference from
2001, and beyond. 23
The Metropolitan Statistical Areas used by the BLS are designated by the U.S. Census
Bureau. I link ZIP codes to MSAs using Census Bureau designations for 2010, and identify the
ZIP code of a firm’s headquarters using Compustat listings for its mailing address, because many
companies incorporate outside of the state where their operational headquarters may be located for
tax and governance reasons. To ensure that total changes in overall employment are not affecting
the results, I drop observations in which a 25% reduction in the sum of Reporters and
Correspondents and Broadcast News Analysts is accompanied by a reduction in overall
employment as recorded by the OES. Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) find that GICS classifications
explain stock return comovements better than SIC and NAICS industry classification systems, and

22 The 25% cutoff is used because it closely approximates the employment reductions explored in Gao, Lee, and
Murphy (2019) when one of a county’s newspapers closes. Two of the examples mentioned in Gao, Lee, and Murphy
(2019) are the closure of the Denver Rocky Mountain News in Colorado and the Cincinnati Post in Ohio. Those
closures were reflected as 28% and 27%, respectively, losses in media category employment in the BLS data. Testing
other cutoff levels of 20% and 30% yield similar results to those reported here.
23 In 2003 and 2004, the OES was released twice, in May and November. I use the data released for the May survey
results in those years for consistency. In 2004, the number of Reporters and Correspondents and Broadcast News
Analysts were the same in both surveys.
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Levi and Welch (2017) find that a firm market value strongly correlates with a firm’s beta and
other market model factor similarities when compared with other firms. I find exact matches for
each sample firm by year and by 6-digit G industry code, and then match, without replacement, by
market value within 15% and within 15% of the beta of the treated firm’s calculated beta in the
Fama-French Three Factor model regressions. The Fama-French Three Factor model is:
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return to the firm i at time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is the return to

a value-weighted market portfolio, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is the difference of the return to small market value stocks

minus larger firms, and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is the difference between the return to high book-to-market stocks
and low book-to-market firms. Regressions use daily returns for firms and the value-weighted

market portfolio from the CRSP database, and daily returns to the small-minus-big and the highminus-low portfolios, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , are from the factor file on Kenneth French’s website.

I eliminate firms with relevant missing control variable data from Compustat or CRSP and

firms with common stock share prices that closed the year trading under $2 to mitigate the effects
of the smallest value firms affecting results.
My final sample consists of 1,373 firms headquartered in locations that experienced media
employment reductions and their 1,373 controls in areas that have not.

Earnings
I use three earnings benchmarks to evaluate meet-or-just-beat behavior. The first examines
only those firms in the sample that are covered by at least one financial analyst and calculates
analyst forecast error as:
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1

Where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the reported annual earnings per share (EPS) for firm i for the year t, and

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is the mean of all analyst forecasts during the three-month period before the end of

the fiscal year. When 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = $0, a firm’s reported EPS matched the consensus forecast exactly.
The statistical test uses bins set at a width of $0.0025 (a quarter of a cent) to determine the
distribution discontinuity of reported earnings around the benchmark 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = $0. A large

discontinuity around the benchmark is the probability that earnings were managed to meet or just
beat the benchmark (Byzalov and Basu, 2019). The statistical test considers a subsample of bins
on either side of the benchmark to determine the parameters of the “normal” distribution of
earnings around the benchmark. Observations, as reported in Tables 1 and 2, are not firm-years
but the number of firms that reported earnings within the subsample considered.
The second measure is employed for firms that are not covered by financial analysts. It
considers the difference in EPS reported in year t from year t-1.
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1

The final measurement, used for all treated and control firms, examines the discontinuity
distribution around a reported net income of zero and is scaled by market value of the firm,
following Burgstahler and Chuk’s (2015) recommendations for discontinuity tests.

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

Where 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 is net income for firm i at year t and 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 is market value (number of common

shares outstanding multiplied by share price) of firm i at year t.
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Mean analyst EPS forecasts are taken from the Summary file in the IBES database; actual
EPS, net income, and market value are taken from the Compustat database.

Discretionary accruals
I employ two well-established measures of discretionary accruals, the Jones model (Jones,
1991) and the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). TA is
defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities minus
depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets. The Jones model measures
discretionary accruals using the following regression estimated cross-sectionally each year for all
firm-year observations in the same two-digit GICS code:

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 �

1
� + 𝛽𝛽2 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1

Where 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is change in sales and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is net property, plant, and equipment. Both

values are scaled by lagged total assets (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ) to mitigate heteroscedasticity in the residuals.

I follow Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2015) and estimate the regression with the intercept, 𝛽𝛽0 , to

provide an additional control for heteroscedasticity and to mitigate problems stemming from an
omitted size variable. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2015) also recommend the addition of the
performance control 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 because firms experiencing extreme performance may exhibit higher

levels of “normal” discretionary accruals. Abnormal discretionary accruals are measured as the
absolute value of the residual, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , from the equation.

The modified Jones model employs the same equation except a firm’s change in accounts

receivable (𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is subtracted from 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 before estimation.
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All values are taken from the Compustat database, as are the additional control variables
employed in the dynamic difference-in-differences regression, market-to-book and the logtransformed market value of the firm.
Executive turnover
The dependent variable in the probit model of executive turnover takes a value of 1 if the
Execucomp database indicates a CEO left the firm for a reason other than retirement in the three
years after the reduction in local media employment is recorded (year t = 0) for firms in the treated
sample or a matched control firm. Data from Execucomp and Compustat is available for a total of
751 firms, with 362 of them having experienced a reduction in local media employment in the area
where they are headquartered. In addition to firm and return characteristics, I use CEO age and
tenure as controls, both of which are taken from the Execucomp database.

Executive compensation
I use two measures of executive compensation from the Execucomp database, Total SEC
and Total compensation — Alternate Method 2. Total SEC is taken from firm filings with the SEC
on the overall level of payment to executives and includes salary, bonus, stock awards, option
awards, nonequity incentives, pension changes, and other compensation. Alternate Method 2 uses
most of the elements of the Total SEC compensation except that stock and option awards are
valued using the value realized from option exercise or stock vesting instead of the amount charged
to the income statement in filings to the SEC.
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METHODOLOGY
Earnings
Early research on earnings discontinuity focused on the empirical histogram of the bins
around a theorized target (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999;
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003), which employs standardized difference tests and cannot easily
incorporate multiple explanatory variables. To study the determinants of meet-or-just-beat
behavior, researchers have generally employed a logit model that assigns a dummy variable of 1
or 0 based on whether an observation occurs at a particular bin (i.e., around zero or at round number
such as 1 or 10 cents) of interest (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002;
Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Jiang, Petroni and Wang,
2010). However, Byzalov and Basu (2019) argue that the logit model can yield erroneous
inferences about the determinants of meet-or-just-beat behavior. They suggest that if a determinant
affects the mean or variance of pre-managed earnings, then the probability of unmanaged small
profits also varies with that determinant. The small- or zero-profit dummy variable employed in
the logit model will include both managed and unmanaged earnings. Therefore, the probability
that a reported earnings number will be assigned to the bin of interest varies with the determinant,
even if the determinant does not affect meet-or-just-beat behavior. Byzalov and Basu (2019)
develop a statistical test that allows the distribution shape to vary with multiple explanatory
variables, by assuming a smooth distribution of pre-managed earnings and a discontinuous
incremental effect at the benchmark of interest. They use local polynomial approximations to
model the smooth pre-managed distribution and interact the polynomial terms with explanatory
variables to implement the conditioning on determinants. The data outside the small-loss and
small-profit intervals identify the pre-managed distribution conditional on the determinants, and
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the missing small losses or increased small profits identify meet-or-just beat behavior. Employing
this method allows distribution discontinuity and its determinants to be identified with OLS
regressions in each stage of the estimation. The first stage estimates parameters outside the bins of
interest, and the second stage tests observations inside the bins of interest for distribution
discontinuity.
Byzalov and Basu (2019) suggest using a third-order (cubic) polynomial 24 and their
empirical tests demonstrate the bins from -1 cent to +1 cent are most suitable for examining
discontinuity distributions The parameters estimated are an estimated intercept, α0; a linear trend,
α1; a quadratic trend, α2; and the cubic trend, α3. The earnings management probability is calculated
as π0. I employ the Byzalov and Basu (2019) tests for distribution discontinuity using three settings.
In the first test, I use the portion of the sample that is covered by analysts to assess meet-or-justbeat behavior of mean analyst EPS forecasts. I conduct separate tests on the treated sample of firms
before (at year t < -1) and after (at year t ≥ -1) a reduction in local media employment. I also
examine the behavior of firms in the control sample. For firms that are not covered by analysts, I
create the same subsamples and test the difference between current year reported EPS and prioryear EPS. These tests are unrestricted and do not control for possible determinants of meet-or-justbeat behavior. Following Byzalov and Basu (2019), I set the bin widths at 0.0025 and examine the
16 bins on either side of 0, [-0.04 to 0.04), to establish the first stage parameter estimates, and the
8 bins around 0 [-0.01 to 0.01) for the probability of discontinuity.
In my final test, I examine discontinuities around zero reported earnings 25. This test uses
the full sample of treated and matched control firms, and includes a number of controls that prior

24

According to Byzalov and Basu (2019), cubic terms are often significant and improve approximation quality,
while higher order terms are consistently insignificant in their explanatory power for the distribution continuity.
25 Earnings is net income scaled by market value to control for size differences in the bins, as recommended by
Burgstahler and Chuk (2015)
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research finds are associated with meet-or-just-beat behavior. Following Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) I control for current asset (CA) intensity and current liability (CL) intensity as proxies for
a firm’s ability to manage earnings by manipulating working capital. Burgstahler and Chuk (2017)
also suggest intensity of costs of goods sold (COGS) and research and development (RD) are
implicit claims that could create contracting incentives for earnings management. CA intensity is
the ratio of non-cash current assets to the market value of equity and CL intensity is the ratio of
current liabilities to the market value of equity. COGS intensity is the ratio of cost of goods sold
to total assets, and RD intensity is the ratio of R&D expense to total assets. I replace missing R&D
expenses with zero.

Discretionary accruals
The change in abnormal discretionary accruals is evaluated using a dynamic difference-indifferences model with abnormal discretionary accruals calculated from the Jones (1991) and the
modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) as the dependent variable:
(1)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘≥1

+ � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠

𝑡𝑡

All standard errors, in model (1) and all other regression models employed in this paper,
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by OES area number (the level of assignment of
treatment) to address possible serial correlation in the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan, 2004). The model includes state- and year-fixed effects. Additional controls include
the market-to-book value of the firm as an additional control for growth opportunities and size as
measured by the log-transformed market value of the firm. In separate tests (Table 3, Columns 3
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and 4), I include other indicators of the firms information environment, a dummy variable equaling
1 if a firm has at least one analyst covering the firm (Analyst Coverage) and a dummy variable
equaling 1 if the firm is listed on the S&P 1500 index (S&P 1500).
The dynamic difference-in-differences controls also include the original independent
variables used to estimate the residuals in the Jones and modified Jones models. Chen, Hribar and
Melessa (2018) find that the typical implementation of the Jones and modified Jones models that
use residuals as a dependent variable generates biased coefficients and standard errors that can
lead to incorrect inferences. Because the magnitude of the bias in coefficients and standard errors
is a function of the correlations between model regressors, they find that including the independent
variables from the original discretionary accrual estimation can correct the bias. Therefore, I
include 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (or 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 less 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , in the modified Jones tests) and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , scaled by

lagged total assets, as well as the reciprocal of total assets as additional controls. I also include the
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2015) performance control, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 used in the original abnormal
discretionary accruals estimation.

Executive Turnover
I estimate a probit model for treated and control firms at year t = 0, where the dependent
variable, Turn, takes a value of 1 if the CEO is replaced for any reason other than retirement in the
following three years, according to the Execucomp database.
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=1−3 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑆𝑆&𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

Where the independent variable of interest Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm

recorded a reduction in local media employment at year t = 0. Analyst Coverage is a dummy
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variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least one analyst following it, and S&P Index is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the S&P 1500 index. Both variables are intended to capture
some of the other information environment around the firm and are likely related to board and
managerial reputational risk. Annual Returns are the realized returns for the firm at year t = 0
minus the value-weighted return to the market portfolio recorded in CRSP (Weisbach, 2001). ROA
is net income divided by total assets. Both variables are intended to control for past performance.
Book-to-market (BTM) also controls for performance, as well as size, and total assets (TA) controls
for size as measured by book value of the firm. Leverage is total debt over total assets and can be
indicative of the bankruptcy risk of the firm; Strebulaev and Yang (2013) also find that firm debt
levels are correlated with CEO characteristics. CEO age and CEO tenure control for CEO
characteristics that may be associated with turnover and are calculated as described previously.

Executive compensation
My final test examines CEO compensation between treated and control firms in the period
after a reduction in local media employment is recorded for the treated sample.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1

+ 𝛽𝛽4 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆. 𝐷𝐷. 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

Where Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has experienced a reduction in local
media employment. Control variables follow Hwang and Kim (2009) and include market value of
the firm, as a control for size; lagged annual returns for two years prior (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 and
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 ) and the lagged standard deviation of returns (𝑆𝑆. 𝐷𝐷. 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ), which
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may affect evaluation of the CEO’s performance. Leverage, ROA, and CEO tenure are as described
previously.

RESULTS
Earnings
Table 1 shows the results for the unrestricted tests of discontinuity for actual EPS and
consensus analyst forecast and actual EPS to year-ago EPS. The firms that experienced a reduction
in media employment show significant probability (p < 0.01) of having managed earnings to meet
analyst mean forecasts (Column 1) 26. Significantly, the same firms do not show a significant
probability of having managed earnings before the reduction in local media employment (Column
2). Control firms with analyst coverage (Column 3) also show significant probability of having
managed earnings but with a lower probability (p < 0.05) than post-treatment firms. The tests of
meet-or-just-beat behavior against year-ago EPS of firms without analyst coverage indicate
significant probability of post-treatment firms’ managing their earnings, while the discontinuity
distribution is not significant for the same firms before the recorded reduction in media
employment nor the sample of control firms. However, the relatively low number of observations
in the meet-beat year-ago EPS test may indicate that year-ago EPS is not a particularly relevant
benchmark for firms as so few observations are with the -4 cent to +4 cent range. Still, all six
columns considered collectively are consistent with firms changing their behavior around reported
earnings after a reduction in local media employment.
I use the zero net income benchmark in a full sample analysis with control variables,
allowed by the Byzalov and Basu (2019) method. The dummy variable Treat is a dummy variable
26

Results in Columns 1, 2, and 3 are nearly identical when using median analyst forecast as the benchmark rather
than mean analyst forecast.
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equaling 1 if a firm has experienced a reduction in local media and is in the period year t = -1 to
+6 from the time the reduction was recorded at year t = 0. Treat is lightly significant (p < 0.1) and
positively associated with the probability of earnings management. Control variables that have
been shown to be significant influences on earnings management in prior research are
insignificant, except for R&D Intensity (p < 0.01). Analyst Coverage is also insignificant, despite
analysts theorized role in corporate governance and monitoring.

Discretionary accruals
The measures of abnormal discretionary accruals (Table 3) are highly significant (p < 0.01)
in all specifications of the dynamic difference-in-differences model for years t = -1 to +1 27. In the
Jones model without the information environment controls (Column 1), year t = +6 is significantly
positively correlated with a reduction in media employment (p < 0.05), and for the modified Jones
model without information environment controls, the year t = + 3 is lightly significant (p < 0.1).
With the information environment controls, Analyst Coverage and S&P 1500, the effect on
discretionary accruals appear even more persistent, with years t = +3, +5, and +6 showing
statistically significant variations in abnormal accruals in the years after a reduction in local media
employment. Being included in the S&P 1500 index appears to have a negative correlation with
abnormal discretionary accruals, consistent with increased attention to a firm dissuading managers
from employing accrual management. However, Analyst Coverage is not significant for either
measure of discretionary accruals.

27

Although the media employment reduction is recorded in year t = 0, the actual reduction may have occurred as
much as two years earlier, so the difference occurring in year t = -1 is consistent with the effect being driven by
employment shock. In tests of parallel trends, I allow variables for each year t = -6 to +6 and no significant effects
are detected before year t = -1.
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CEO turnover
Being headquartered in an area where local media employment has fallen is lightly
correlated (p < 0.1) with a decrease in the probability that a CEO will be replaced within the next
three years (Table 4). The marginal effect of being headquartered in an area with fewer journalists
is 3.3% reduced chance of turnover. The other information environment controls do not appear to
play a significant role in the probability of turnover. Only the control for firm size, log of total
assets, demonstrates a significant relationship to the probability of CEO turnover. The limited
sample size may restrict the power of the test, but the test provides some evidence consistent with
managers and members of the board of directors suffering less reputational risk when firms are
headquartered in an area with fewer journalists.

CEO compensation
I test both overall levels of compensation (Table 5, Columns 1 and 2) and year-over-year
change in compensation (Columns 3 and 4) for treated and control firms in the years after a
reduction in media employment (i.e., years t = -1 to +6). The dummy variable is significantly
positively correlated with overall levels of both measures of compensation (p < 0.01); however, in
considering the changes in compensation, only the measure of overall compensation that includes
actual value of stock and option sales is significantly correlated with a reduction in local media
employment. Collectively, the findings are consistent both with firms being less constrained in
their compensation levels and with managers being less constrained in their exercise and trading
of shares and options after a reduction in media employment. This does not necessarily
demonstrate agency problems, and in fact Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that executive
compensation is suboptimal because of sensational media coverage. However, these findings are
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consistent with media attention, even local media attention, putting constraints on executive
compensation.

CONCLUSION
My findings provide evidence consistent with local media providing an element of
monitoring and potential reputational risk documented among members of the national and
financial press. Managers appear to exhibit behavior consistent with a perceived increased
opportunity to engage in potentially value-destroying behavior and appear to face less employment
risk despite that. Compensation levels, and specifically changes in profitable exercises of stock
and options, are consistent with boards and managers facing less reputational risk for increases in
executive compensation.
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TABLES
Table 3.1: Unrestricted test for meet-beat analyst forecasts and year-ago EPS
Estimates for Byzalov and Basu (2019) distribution discontinuity test at the just-meet and just-beat mean analyst
estimates and year-ago EPS bins for firms that have experienced a reduction in media employment in the areas where
the firm is headquartered and matching sample of control firms. Bin widths are set at 0.0025, and discontinuity is tested
for the 8 bins around a 0 difference between actual EPS and mean analyst forecast. The estimation interval is [-0.04,
0.04) difference between actual EPS and mean forecasts and actual EPS and year-ago EPS, following recommendations
in Byzalov and Basu (2019). α is the polynomial coefficient in the probability function of pre-managed earnings at the
intercept (α0), a linear function (α1), a quadratic function (α2) and a cubic function (α3). π0 is the earnings management
probability for just-meet, just-beat observations. Columns 1 and 4 are the results of the discontinuity test on firms after
they have experienced a reduction in local media employment; Columns 2 and 5 are results of the test on the same firms
before the reduction is recorded; Columns 3 and 6 show the results for a matched sample of control firms.
Meet-beat analyst estimates
(1)
(2)
(3)
PostPreControl
treatment
treatment
firms
firms
firms
-0.007***
-0.003
-0.004**
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.125
0.290***
-0.064
(0.079)
(0.094)
(0.072)
3.018***
1.650***
2.522***
(0.239)
(0.286)
(0.220)
2.593***
-1.102
2.135**
(0.829)
(0.905)
(0.677)

Meet-beat year-ago EPS
(4)
(5)
(6)
PostPreControl
treatment
treatment
firms
firms
firms
0.043***
0.012
0.042***
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.010)
-0.999*
-0.541
0.615
(0.417)
(0.469)
(0.473)
-1.141
2.176
-1.385
(1.140)
(1.417)
(0.966)
9.272*
7.841
-4.500
(3.965)
(4.474)
(3.967)

π0

-3.119***
(1.001)

7.957
(8.258)

-4.974**
(2.092)

0.163**
(0.074)

0.232
(0.341)

-0.104
(0.126)

Obs.

2,736

1,629

2,661

143

107

160

α0
α1
α2
α3

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2: Positive earnings with controls
Estimates for Byzalov and Basu (2019) discontinuity test for
for zero or just-positive earnings. Earnings is net income
scaled by market value to control for size differences in bins
from [-0.06, 0.06). Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
firm has experienced a reduction in media employment in
the areas where the firm is headquartered. Analyst Coverage is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one analyst has issued
an earnings forecast for the firm in the year before earnings
is reported. Other control variables are intensity of Costs of
Goods Sold, R&D, Current Assets, and Current Liabilities.
Bin widths are set at 0.0025, and discontinuity is tested for
the 16 bins around 0 earnings reported with parameters
estimated from the 24 bins on either side of 0 earnings.. α is
the polynomial coefficient in the probability function of
pre-managed earnings at the intercept (α0), a linear function
(α1), a quadratic function (α2) and a cubic function (α3). π0 is
the earnings management probability for the 16 bins on
either side of 0 earnings. The coefficients for the interaction
terms between the control variables and the parameters α0,
α1, α2, and α3 are not shown.

α0
α1
α2
α3

Earnings
around 0
0.022***
(0.003)
0.595***
(0.092)
0.054
(0.141)
-0.835**
(0.344)

π0

-0.039
(0.060)

π Treat

0.048*
(0.028)

π Analyst Coverage

-0.066
(0.053)
-0.039
(0.028)
0.427***
(0.120)
0.045
(0.091)
-0.027
(0.125)

π COGS Intensity
π R&D Intensity
π CA Intensity
π CL Intensity
Obs

10,086

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Local media reductions and discretionary accruals
Table 3 shows the results of the correlation between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and years t
= -1 to +6 when a reduction in local media employment is recorded at year t = 0. Columns 1 and 2 show
results of discretionary accruals measured by the Jones (1991) model and the modified Jones (1995) model
of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney. Columns 3 and 4 include controls associated with the information
environment of the firm.
(1)

Market-to-book
Market value
ROA
1/Total assets
Δ Sales
Δ PPE
Year t = -1
Year t = 0
Year t = 1
Year t = 2
Year t = 3
Year t = 4
Year t = 5
Year t = 6

Jones model
discretionary
accruals
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.006)
0.795***
(0.291)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.013
(0.026)

(2)
Modified
Jones model
discretionary
accruals
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.006)
0.732**
(0.283)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.011
(0.026)

Jones model
discretionary
accruals
0.008***
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)
-0.009*
(0.005)
0.832***
(0.283)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.018
(0.025)

(4)
Modified
Jones model
discretionary
accruals
0.008***
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.768***
(0.275)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.016
(0.025)

0.020***
(0.006)
0.024***
(0.009)
0.018***
(0.007)
0.007
(0.007)
0.012
(0.008)
0.002
(0.006)
0.011
(0.007)
0.019**
(0.008)

0.020***
(0.007)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.007)
0.006
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.002
(0.006)
0.007
(0.006)
0.011
(0.007)

0.020***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.008)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.005
(0.006)
0.015**
(0.007)
0.025***
(0.007)

0.020***
(0.006)
0.021***
(0.008)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.007
(0.006)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.005
(0.006)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.016**
(0.007)

-0.001
(0.005)
-0.040***
(0.007)

-0.001
(0.005)
-0.039***
(0.007)

Analyst Coverage
S&P 1500
Obs.
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Year fixed effects
State fixed effects

(3)

17,357
0.213
0.209

17,351
0.208
0.205

17,357
0.217
0.214

17,351
0.213
0.210

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Probability of executive turnover
Table 4 shows the results of a probit model estimation in which the outcome variable is 1 if a CEO leaves the
firm for any reason other than retirement in the three years after year t = 0 and 0 otherwise.
Probability of
executive turnover
in next 3 years
Treat
Analyst Coverage
S&P Index
Book-to-market
Annual returns
Leverage ratio
ROA
Log of total assets
CEO age
CEO tenure
Intercept

Coef.
-0.263*
-0.096
-0.146
0.061
-0.152
-0.208
-0.727
0.129***
0.003
0.019**
-2.277***

Mean dependent variable
Pseudo r-squared
Chi-square

St.Err.
0.149
0.248
0.182
0.129
0.178
0.365
0.479
0.049
0.005
0.010
0.413
0.068
0.056
20.724

t-value
-1.77
-0.39
-0.81
0.47
-0.85
-0.57
-1.52
2.65
0.67
2.02
-5.51

p-value
0.077
0.698
0.421
0.634
0.394
0.568
0.129
0.008
0.505
0.043
0.000

SD dependent var
Number of obs
Prob > chi2

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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[95% Conf

Interval]

-0.556
-0.582
-0.503
-0.191
-0.501
-0.923
-1.666
0.034
-0.006
0.001
-3.087

0.029
0.390
0.210
0.314
0.197
0.507
0.212
0.225
0.013
0.038
-1.467
0.252
751
0.023

Table 3.5: Executive compensation of firms with nearby media reduction vs. controls
Table 5 shows results from the OLS regression of CEO compensation and changes in CEO compensation for firms that
have experienced a reduction in media employment in the area where the firm is headquartered and a matching set of
control firms. Columns 1 and 3 use compensation and changed in compensation reported by the firm to the SEC, and
Columns 2 and 4 use a calculation that includes the CEO’s actual profits from stock and option sales and exercises.
(1)

Treatment
One-year lag returns
Two-year lag returns
Market value
Book-to-market
Leverage
Lag st. dev. of returns
ROA
Tenure
Intercept

Total
compensation
reported to SEC
2683.903***
(724.653)

(2)
Total
compensation
adjusted for stock,
option sales
9590.898***
(2448.840)

Δ Total
compensation
reported to SEC
-568.722
(728.485)

(4)
Δ Total
compensation
adjusted for stock,
option sales
142.122***
(20.572)

70.612
(63.997)
78.417
(52.082)
240.299
(364.393)
322.432
(377.626)
1849.304*
(1023.778)
440.575
(1141.403)
1054.867
(659.895)
58.827**
(29.293)
-3412.141
(2628.762)

79.659
(76.146)
180.968**
(83.677)
-243.317
(861.846)
-159.024
(499.411)
1131.811
(2352.879)
-920.422
(2709.048)
-197.409
(2490.713)
496.051***
(36.928)
2943.716
(8675.958)

16.353
(79.765)
-23.121
(20.243)
-68.344
(111.662)
-33.107
(47.630)
-1197.312
(1624.598)
-597.316
(488.897)
-502.400
(561.667)
16.758
(22.159)
856.578
(1159.070)

19.507
(26.799)
-2.228
(2.877)
57.810***
(21.869)
-9.719
(12.946)
58.143
(97.806)
46.185
(105.814)
-20.985
(55.610)
-6.882***
(0.980)
-364.897**
(161.568)

3,423
0.772
0.714

3,416
0.562
0.450

2,804
0.173
-0.057

2,752
0.456
0.304

Obs.
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

124

(3)

References
Abdoh, H. and Varela, O. (2017) “Product market competition, idiosyncratic and systematic
volatility,” Journal of Corporate Finance. Elsevier B.V., 43, pp. 500–513.
Ahn, M. et al. (2019) “The role of the business press in the pricing of analysts’ recommendation
revisions,” Review of Accounting Studies, 24(1).
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp. 488–500.
Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W. and Rubin, D. B. (1996) “Identification of Causal Effects Using
Instrumental Variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91(434), pp. 444–
455.
Antweiler, W. and Frank, M. Z. (2004) “Is all that talk just noise? The information content of
Internet stock message boards,” Journal of Finance, 59(3), pp. 1259–1294.
Antweiler, W. and Frank, M. Z. (2011) “Do US Stock Markets Typically Overreact to Corporate
News Stories?” SSRN Electronic Journal, (1998), pp. 1–22.
Ashbaugh, H., LaFond, R. and Mayhew, B. W. (2003) “Do nonaudit services compromise auditor
independence? Further evidence,” Accounting Review, 78(3), pp. 611–639.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H. et al. (2008) “The effect of SOX internal control deficiencies and their
remediation on accrual quality,” Accounting Review, 83(1), pp. 217–250.
Ball, R. (2013) “Accounting informs investors and earnings management is rife: Two questionable
beliefs,” Accounting Horizons, 27(4), pp. 847–853.

125

Ball, R., Bushman, R. M. and Vasvari, F. P. (2008) “The debt-contracting value of accounting
information and loan syndicate structure,” Journal of Accounting Research, 46(2), pp. 247–
287.
Baloria, V. P. and Heese, J. (2018) “The effects of media slant on firm behavior,” Journal of
Financial Economics. Elsevier B.V., 129(1), pp. 184–202.
Barber, B. M. and Odean, T. (2008) “All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the
buying behavior of individual and institutional investors,” Review of Financial Studies,
21(2), pp. 785–818.
Beneish, M. D. and Vargus, M. E. (2002) “Insider trading, earnings quality and accrual
mispricing,” Accounting Review, 77(4), pp. 755–791.
Benston, G. J. and Hagerman, R. L. (1974) “Determinants of bid-asked spreads in the over-thecounter market,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1(4), pp. 353–364.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and Mullainathan, S. (2004) “How much should we trust differrences-indifferences estimates?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), pp. 249–275.
Bharath, S. T., Sunder, J. and Sunder, S. v. (2008) “Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting,”
Accounting Review, The, 83(1), pp. 1–28.
Bhojraj, S. et al. (2009) “Making sense of cents: An examination of firms that marginally miss or
beat analyst forecasts,” Journal of Finance, 64(5), pp. 2361–2388.
Bhojraj, S., Lee, C. M. C. and Oler, D. K. (2003) “What’s My Line? A Comparison of Industry
Classification Schemes for Capital Market Research,” Journal of Accounting Research,
41(5), pp. 745–774.

126

Blankespoor, E., DeHaan, E. and Zhu, C. (2018) “Capital market effects of media synthesis and
dissemination: evidence from robo-journalism,” Review of Accounting Studies, 23(1).
Blundell, R. and Costa Dias, M. (2009) “Alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical
microeconomics,” Journal of Human Resources, 44(3), pp. 565–641.
Botosan, C. A. and Plumlee, M. A. (2002) “A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the
Expected Cost of Equity Capital,” Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), pp. 21–40.
Burgstahler, D. C. and Eames, M. J. (2003) “Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings
Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?” Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(2), pp. 253–
294.
Burgstahler, D. C., Hail, L. and Leuz, C. (2006) “The importance of reporting incentives: Earnings
management in European private and public firms,” Accounting Review, 81(5), pp. 983–
1016.
Burgstahler, D. and Chuk, E. (2015) “Do scaling and selection explain earnings discontinuities?,”
Journal of Accounting and Economics. Elsevier, 60(1), pp. 168–186.
Burgstahler, D. and Chuk, E. (2017) “What Have We Learned About Earnings Management?
Integrating Discontinuity Evidence,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(2), pp. 726–
749.
Burgstahler, D. and Dichev, I. D. (1997) “Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and
Losses,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(3), pp. 99–126.
Bushee, B. J. et al. (2010) “The role of the business press as an information intermediary,” Journal
of Accounting Research, 48(1), pp. 1–19.

127

Bushee, B. J., Gow, I. D. and Taylor, D. J. (2018) “Linguistic Complexity in Firm Disclosures:
Obfuscation or Information?,” Journal of Accounting Research, 56(1).
Bushman, R. M. and Smith, A. J. (2001) “Financial accounting information and corporate
governance,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, pp. 237–333.
Busse, J. A. and Green, T. C. (2002) “Market efficiency in real time,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 65(3), pp. 415–437.
Byzalov, D. and Basu, S. (2019) “Modeling the determinants of meet-or-just-beat behavior in
distribution discontinuity tests,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 68(1–29).
Cage, J., Herve, N. and Viaud, M.-L. (2019) “The Production of Information in an Online World,”
The Review of Economic Studies, (December 2019).
Call, A. C. et al. (2018) “Meet the Press: Survey Evidence on Financial Journalists As Information
Intermediaries,” Working Paper.
Carhart, M. M. (1997) “On persistence in mutual fund performance,” Journal of Finance, 52(1),
pp. 57–82.
Carlin, B. I., Longstaff, F. A. and Matoba, K. (2014) “Disagreement and asset prices,” Journal of
Financial Economics. Elsevier, 114(2), pp. 226–238.
Carvalho, C., Klagge, N. and Moench, E. (2011) “The persistent effects of a false news shock,”
Journal of Empirical Finance. Elsevier B.V., 18(4), pp. 597–615.
Chan, K. C., Christie, W. G. and Schultz, P. H. (1995) “Market Structure and the Intraday Pattern
of Bid-Ask Spreads for NASDAQ Securities,” Journal of Business, 68(1), pp. 35–60.

128

Chan, L. K. C. and Lakonishok, J. (2004) “Value and growth investing: Review and update,”
Financial Analysts Journal, 60(1), pp. 71–86.
Chan, W. C. (2003) “Stock price reaction to news and no-news: drift and reversal after headlines,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 70(2), pp. 223–260.
Chapman, K. (2018) “Earnings notifications, investor attention, and the earnings announcement
premium,” Journal of Accounting and Economics. Elsevier B.V., 66(1), pp. 222–243.
Cheng, Q. and Warfield, T. D. (2005) “Equity incentives and earnings management,” Accounting
Review, 80(2), pp. 441–476.
Chen, W., Hribar, P. and Melessa, S. (2018) “Incorrect Inferences When Using Residuals as
Dependent Variables,” Journal of Accounting Research, 56(3), pp. 751–796.
Chung, K. H. and Jo, H. (2016) “The Impact of Security Analysts ’ Monitoring and Marketing
Functions on the Market Value of Firms,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
31(4), pp. 493–512.
Collins, D. W. and Hribar, P. (2000) “Earnings-based and accrual-based market anomalies: One
effect or two?,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1), pp. 101–123.
Copeland, T. E. and Galai, D. (1983) “Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread,” The Journal
of Finance, 38(5), pp. 1457–1469.
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R. and Verdi, R. (2008) “Is accruals quality a priced risk factor?,” Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), pp. 2–22.
Cressey, D.R., 1973. Other People’s Money, Patterson Smith: Montclair.
Da, Z., Engelberg, J. and Gao, P. (2011) “In Search of Attention,” Journal of Finance, 50(2).
129

Dechow, P. M. and Dichev, I. D. (2002) “The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual
estimation errors,” Accounting Review, The, 77 (Supplement: Quality of Earnings
Conference), pp. 35–59.
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W. and Schrand, C. (2010) “Understanding earnings quality: A review of the
proxies, their determinants and their consequences,” Journal of Accounting and
Economics.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G. and Sweeney, A. P. (1995) “Detecting Earnings Management,”
Accounting Review, The, 70(2), pp. 193–225.
Degeorge, F., Patel, J. and Zeckhauser, R. (1999) “Earnings management to exceed thresholds,”
Journal of Business, 72(1), pp. 633–666.
Demers, E. and Lewellen, K. (2003) “The marketing role of IPOs: Evidence from internet stocks,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 68(3), pp. 413–437.
Demsetz, H. (1968) “The cost of transacting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82(1), pp. 33–53.
Desai, H., Rajgopal, S. and Venkatachalam, M. (2004) “Value-glamour and accruals mispricing:
One anomaly or two?” Accounting Review, The, 79(2), pp. 355–385.
Dichev, I. D. and Skinner, D. J. (2002) “Large-sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis,”
Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), pp. 1091–1123.
Dougal, C. et al. (2012) “Journalists and the stock market,” Review of Financial Studies, 25(3),
pp. 640–679.
Drago, F., Nannicini, T. and Sobbrio, F. (2019) “Meet the Press : How Voters and Politicians
Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit,” Applied Economics, 6(3), pp. 159–188.

130

Drake, M. S., Guest, N. M. and Twedt, B. J. (2014) “The Media and Mispricing: The Role of the
Business Press in the Pricing of Accounting Information,” Accounting Review, 89(5), pp.
1673–1701.
Drake, M. S., Thornock, J. R. and Twedt, B. J. (2017) “The internet as an information
intermediary,” Review of Accounting Studies, 22(2).
Dyck, A., Morse, A. and Zingales, L. (2010) “Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud?,” Journal
of Finance, 65(6), pp. 2213–2253.
Dyck, A., Volchkova, N. and Zingales, L. (2008) “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:
Evidence from Russia,” Journal of Finance, 63(3), pp. 1093–1135.
Dyck, A. and Zingales, L. (2002) “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media,” NBER Working
Paper, 9309.
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M. (2004) “Information and the cost of capital,” Journal of Finance, 59(4),
pp. 1553–1583.
Engelberg, J. (2008) “Costly Information Processing: Evidence from Earnings Announcements,”
AFA 2009 San Francisco meetings paper.
Engelberg, J. E. and Parsons, C. A. (2011) “The Causal Impact of Media in Financial Markets,”
Journal of Finance, 66(1), pp. 67–97.
Engelberg, J., Sasseville, C. and Williams, J. (2012) “Market madness? the case of Mad Money,”
Management Science, 58(2), pp. 351–364.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993) “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp. 3–56.

131

Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1997) “Industry costs of equity,” Journal of Financial Economics,
43(2), pp. 153–193.
Fang, L. and Peress, J. (2009) “Media coverage and the cross-section of stock returns,” Journal of
Finance, 64(5), pp. 2023–2052.
Farrell, K. A. and Whidbee, D. A. (2002) “Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO
turnover,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(12), pp. 2249–2276.
Fedyk, A. (2018) “Front Page News: The Effect of News Positioning on Financial Markets for
their invaluable guidance and advice. I am also grateful to,” Working Paper.
Fedyk, A. and Hodson, J. (2014) “When Can the Market Identify Stale News?” Working Paper,
pp. 1–53.
Flannery, M. J. and Rangan, K. P. (2006) “Partial adjustment toward target capital structures,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 79(3), pp. 469–506.
Francis, J. et al. (2005) “The market pricing of accruals quality,” Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 39(2), pp. 295–327.
Frankel, R. M., Johnson, M. F. and Nelson, K. K. (2002) “The relation between auditors’ fees for
nonaudit services and earnings management,” Accounting Review, The, 77(SUPPL.), pp.
71–105.
Gao, P., Lee, C. and Murphy, D. (2019) “Financing dies in darkness? The impact of newspaper
closures on public finance,” Journal of Financial Economics, (312).
Gaspar, J. M. and Massa, M. (2006) “Idiosyncratic volatility and product market competition,”
Journal of Business, 79(6), pp. 3125–3152.

132

Gelb, D. S. and Zarowin, P. (2002) “Corporate disclosure policy and the informativeness of stock
prices,” Review of Accounting Studies, 7(1), pp. 33–52.
Gerig, A. (2015) “High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial Markets,” U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis Working
Paper.
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H. M. (2011) “Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and
Equity Prices,” Journal of Finance, 66(2), pp. 563–600.
Glosten, L. R. and Milgrom, P. R. (1985) “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” Journal of Financial Economics, 14, pp. 71–100.
Gompers, P. A. and Metrick, A. (2001) “Institutional investors and equity prices,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116(1), pp. 229–259.
Gong, S. X., Gul, F. A. and Shan, L. (2018) “Do auditors respond to media coverage? Evidence
from China,” Accounting Horizons, 32(3).
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R. and Rajgopal, S. (2005) “The economic implications of corporate
financial reporting,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1–3), pp. 3–73.
Graham, J. R., Li, S. and Qiu, J. (2012) “Managerial attributes and executive compensation,”
Review of Financial Studies, 25(1), pp. 144–186.
Grossman, S. J. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1976) “Information and Competitive Price Systems,” The
American Economic Review, 66(2), pp. 249–253.
Grossman, S. J. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1980) “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets,” American Economic Review, The, 70(3), pp. 393–408.

133

Grullon, G., Kanatas, G. and Weston, J. P. (2004) “Advertising, breadth of ownership, and
liquidity,” Review of Financial Studies, 17(2), pp. 439–461.
Guest, N. M. (2017a) “Do Journalists Help Investors Analyze Firms’ Earnings News?” Working
Paper.
Guest, N. M. (2017b) “Do Journalists Help Investors Analyze Firms’ Earnings News?” Working
Paper.
Guest, N. M. and Kim, J. (2019) “On the Interplay among Information Intermediaries: How Does
Analyst Coverage Affect Media Coverage?” Working Paper.
Gurun, U. G. and Butler, A. W. (2012) “Don’t Believe the Hype: Local Media Slant, Local
Advertising, and Firm Value,” Journal of Finance, 67(2), pp. 561–598.
Healy, P. M. (1985) “The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions,” Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 7(1–3), pp. 85–107.
Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P. and Palepu, K. G. (1999) “Stock Performance and Intermediation
Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure,” Contemporary Accounting
Research, 16(3), pp. 485–520.
Healy, P. M. and Palepu, K. G. (2001) “Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature,” Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 31(1–3), pp. 405–440.
Heckman, J. J., Lochner, L. and Taber, C. (1998) “Explaining Rising Wage Inequality:
Explorations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings with
Heterogeneous Agents,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(1), pp. 1–58.

134

Hoberg, G., Phillips, G. and Prabhala, N. (2014) “Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial
Flexibility,” Journal of Finance, 69(1), pp. 293–324.
Hong, H. and Stein, J. C. (2005) “A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and
overreaction in asset markets,” Advances in Behavioral Finance, 2(6), pp. 502–540.
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T. and Titman, S. (2001) “The Debt-Equity Choice,” The Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36(1), pp. 1–24.
Huang, R. and Ritter, J. R. (2009) “Testing theories of capital structure and estimating the speed
of adjustment,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2), pp. 237–271.
Huberman, G. (2001) “Familiarity breeds investment,” Review of Financial Studies, 14(3), pp.
659–680.
Huberman, G. and Regev, T. (2001) “Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer,” The Journal
of Finance, 56(1), pp. 387–396.
Hughes, J. S., Liu, Jing and Liu, Jun (2007) “Information asymmetry, diversification, and cost of
capital,” Accounting Review, 82(3), pp. 705–729.
Irvine, P. J. and Pontiff, J. (2009) “Idiosyncratic return volatility, cash flows, and product market
competition,” Review of Financial Studies, 22(3), pp. 1149–1177.
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993) “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications
for Stock Market Efficiency,” The Journal of Finance, 48(1), pp. 65–91.
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (2002) “Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Determinants of
Momentum Returns,” Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), pp. 143–157.

135

Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (2011) “Momentum,” The Annual Review of Financial Economics,
3, pp. 493–509.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs,
and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305–360.
Jensen, M. C. and Murphy, K. J. (1990) “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
Jiang, J. (Xuefeng), Petroni, K. R. and Wang, I. Y. (2010) “CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most
influence on earnings management?,” Journal of Financial Economics. Elsevier, 96(3), pp.
513–526.
Joe, J. R. (2003) “Why press coverage of a client influences the audit opinion,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 41(1), pp. 109–133.
Joe, J. R., Louis, H. and Robinson, D. (2009) “Managers and investors responses to media
exposure of board ineffectiveness,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(3),
pp. 579–605.
Jones, J. J. (1991) “Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 29(2), p. 193.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1973) “On the psychology of prediction,” Psychological Review,
80(4), pp. 237–251.
Kim, J. B., Song, B. Y. and Zhang, L. (2011) “Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting:
Evidence from SOX section 404 disclosures,” Accounting Review, 86(4), pp. 1157–1188.
Klein, R. W. and Bawa, V. S. (1977) “The effect of limited information and estimation risk on
optimal portfolio diversification,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5(1), pp. 89–111.
136

Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J. and Wasley, C. E. (2005) “Performance matched discretionary accrual
measures,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), pp. 163–197.
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S. and Wysocki, P. D. (2009) “Do Managers Withhold Bad News ?” Journal
of Accounting Research, 47(1), pp. 241–276.
Kyle, A. S. (1985) “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica, 53(6), pp. 1315–
1335.
Lafond, R. (2005) “Is the Accrual Anomaly a Global Anomaly?” Working Paper
Lambert, R., Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. E. (2007) “Accounting information, disclosure, and the
cost of capital,” Journal of Accounting Research, 45(2), pp. 385–420.
Lee, C. M. C., Mucklow, B. and Ready, M. J. (1993) “Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of Earnings
Information: An Intraday Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies, 6(2), pp. 345–374.
Lehavy, R. and Sloan, R. G. (2008) “Investor recognition and stock returns,” Review of
Accounting Studies, 13(2–3), pp. 327–361.
Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H. (1977) “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and
Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance, XXXII(2), pp. 371–387.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, P. D. (2003) “Earnings management and investor protection:
An international comparison,” Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), pp. 505–527.
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. E. (2000) “The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure,”
Journal of Accounting Research, 38(May), pp. 91–124.
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. E. (2011) “Firms’ Capital Allocation Choices, Information Quality,
and the Cost of Capital,” Working Paper.
137

Leuz, C. and Wysocki, P. D. (2016) “Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and
Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 54(2).
Levi, Y. and Welch, I. (2017) Best Practice for Cost-of-Capital Estimates, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis.
Li, C. (2015) “The hidden face of the media: How financial journalists produce information,”
Working Paper, pp. 1–64.
Li, E. X., Ramesh, K. and Shen, M. (2011) “The role of newswires in screening and disseminating
value-relevant information in periodic SEC reports,” Accounting Review, 86(2), pp. 669–
701.
Liu, B. and McConnell, J. J. (2013) “The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media
influence managers’ capital allocation decisions?” Journal of Financial Economics.
Elsevier, 110(1), pp. 1–17.
Liu, T. et al. (2013) “The Dark Side of Disclosure : Evidence of Government Expropriation from
Worldwide Firms,” World Bank Group, (760), pp. 1–47.
Marshall, B. R., Visaltanachoti, N. and Cooper, G. (2014) “Sell the Rumor, Buy the Fact?”
Accounting and Finance, 54, pp. 237–249.
Maskara, P. K. and Mullineaux, D. J. (2011) “Information asymmetry and self-selection bias in
bank loan announcement studies,” Journal of Financial Economics. Elsevier, 101(3), pp.
684–694.
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002) “Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises,”
Accounting Review, 77(3), pp. 483–514.
138

McInish, T. H. and Wood, R. A. (1992) “An Analysis of Intraday Patterns in Bid / Ask Spreads
for NYSE Stocks,” The Journal of Finance, 47(2), pp. 753–764.
McNichols, M. F. and Stubben, S. R. (2015) “The effect of target-firm accounting quality on
valuation in acquisitions,” Review of Accounting Studies, 20(1), pp. 110–140.
Menkveld, A. J. (2013) “High frequency trading and the new market makers,” Journal of Financial
Markets. Elsevier, 16(4), pp. 712–740.
Merton, R. C. (1987) “A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete
Information,” The Journal of Finance, 42(3), pp. 483–510.
Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004) “Worms: Identifying impacts on education and health in the
presence of treatment externalities,” Econometrica, 72(1), pp. 159–217. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00481.x.
Miller, G. S. (2006) “The press as a watchdog for accounting fraud,” Journal of Accounting
Research, 44(5), pp. 1001–1033.
Miller, G. S. and Skinner, D. J. (2015) “The evolving disclosure landscape: How changes in
technology, the media, and capital markets are affecting disclosure,” Journal of Accounting
Research, 53(2), pp. 221–239.
Moyer, R. C., Chatfield, R. E. and Sisneros, P. M. (1989) “Security Analyst Monitoring Activity:
Agency Costs and Information Demands,” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 24(4), p. 503.
Mutchler, J. F., Hopwood, W. and McKeown, J. M. (1997) “The Influence of Contrary Information
and Mitigating Factors on Audit Opinion Decisions on Bankrupt Companies,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 35(2), p. 295.
139

Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984) “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,” NBER Working Paper, No. 1396.
Neuhierl, A., Scherbina, A. and Schlusche, B. (2013a) Market reaction to corporate press releases,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Neuhierl, A., Scherbina, A. and Schlusche, B. (2013b) “Market reaction to corporate press
releases,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(4), pp. 1207–1240.
Neumann, J. J. and Kenny, P. M. (2007) “Does Mad Money make the market go mad?” Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance, 47(5), pp. 602–615.
Niessner, M. and So, E. C. (2018) “Bad News Bearers: The Negative Tilt of Financial Press,”
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Nikolaev, V. v. (2010) “Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism,” Journal of Accounting
Research, 48(1), pp. 137–176.
Nimark, K. P. and Pitschner, S. (2019) “News media and delegated information choice,” Journal
of Economic Theory. Elsevier Inc., 181, pp. 160–196.
Nyhan, B. and Reifler, J. (2015) “The Effect of Fact-Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on
U.S. State Legislators,” American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), pp. 628–640.
Parsons, C. A., Sulaeman, J. and Titman, S. (2018) “The Geography of Financial Misconduct,”
Journal of Finance, 73(5), pp. 2087–2137.
Pavic, I., Galetic, F. and Piplica, D. (2016) “Similarities and Differences between the CR and HHI
as an Indicator of Market Concentration and Market Power,” British Journal of Economics,
Management & Trade, 13(1), pp. 1–8.

140

Rhoades, S. A. (1995) “Market share inequality, the HHI, and other measures of the firmcomposition of a market,” Review of Industrial Organization, 10(6), pp. 657–674.
Rogers, J. L., Skinner, D. J. and Zechman, S. L. C. (2016) “The role of the media in disseminating
insider-trading news,” Review of Accounting Studies, 21(3).
Schulhofer-Wohl, S. and Garrido, M. (2013) “Do Newspapers Matter? Short-Run and Long-Run
Evidence From the Closure of The Cincinnati Post,” Journal of Media Economics, 26(2),
pp. 60–81.
Shiller, R. J. (1980) “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in
dividends?,” NBER Working Paper, 456, pp. 1–58.
Sloan, R. G. (2001) “Financial accounting and corporate governance: A discussion,” Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 32(1–3), pp. 335–347.
Smith, C. W. and Warner, J. B. (1979) “On financial contracting. An analysis of bond covenants,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), pp. 117–161.
Strebulaev, I. A. and Yang, B. (2013) “The mystery of zero-leverage firms,” Journal of Financial
Economics. Elsevier, 109(1), pp. 1–23.
Tetlock, P. C. (2014) “Information Transmission in Finance,” Annual Review of Financial
Economics, 6(1), pp. 365–384.
Tinic, S. M. (1972) “The Economics of Liquidity Services,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
86(1), pp. 79–93.
Tinic, S. M. and West, R. R. (1972) “Competition and the Pricing of Dealer Service in the Overthe-Counter Stock Market,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 7(3), pp. 1707–
1727.
141

Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1973) “Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability,” Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), pp. 207–232.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases,”
Science, 185(4157), pp. 1124–1131.
Twedt, B. J. (2016) “Spreading the Word: Price discovery and newswire dissemination of
management earnings guidance,” Accounting Review, 91(1), pp. 317–346.
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) “Essays on disclosure,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1–3),
pp. 97–180.
Waldman, S. (2011) “The changing media landscape in a broadband age,” Working Group on
Information Needs of Communities, p. 468.
Welch, I. (2004) “Capital structure and stock returns,” Journal of Political Economy, 112(1), pp.
106–131.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2006). Introductory Econometrics: a Modern Approach. Mason, Ohio:
Thomson/South-Western.
Xu, Y. and Malkiel, B. G. (2003) “Investigating the Behavior of Idiosyncratic Volatility,” Journal
of Business, 76(4), pp. 613–644.
Yuan, Y. (2015) “Market-wide attention, trading, and stock returns,” Journal of Financial
Economics. Elsevier, 116(3), pp. 548–564.
Zhang, J. (2008) “The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers,”
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45(1), pp. 27–54.

142

Vita
Clifford Kyle Jones worked as a writer, editor, and designer before pursuing his Ph.D. in
Business Administration. He previously obtained an MBA and a Bachelor’s of Communication
from the University of Texas at El Paso.

Contact Information: ckylejones@gmail.com

143

